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“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world
to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the
unreasonable man.”
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INTRODUCTION
One would think that the common origin of America and England in
jurisprudence would determine similar choices for both countries in
Case Law. However their approach to Common Law is as divided as
the Ocean that separates them.
Their  diverse  historical  and  cultural  developments  have  produced
two countries  with significant  contrasts,  including vastly differing
legal systems.
In the following text  the  differences  between the  English and the
American  approach  towards  the  evolving  theme  of  assisted
fertilization  techniques  will  be  demonstrated.   Particular  attention
will be focused on heterologous fertilisation and surrogate maternity
as it is these two aspects that pose the most legal questions when
discussing the relationship to the unborn child. Initially the English
legal  system’s  approach  will  be  examined,  followed  by  close
examination of the American jurisprudence.
The historical development of English law regarding the theme of
assisted  fertilisation  will  then  be  discussed  with  special  regard  to
situations  that  impacted  on  the  course  of  the  legislation.  A more
detailed examination will  also be provided of the legal aspects of
individual  fertilisation  techniques,  including  the  more  significant
legal cases.
The study of the United States legislation follows, beginning with a
constitutional analysis of the essential right of any Federal or State
legislation of this country, the Right to Privacy.
Moving  on  to  an  examination  of  the  existing  scant  Federal
legislation, the study then proceeds with an analysis of legislation in
several individual states. The 50 American States have the freedom
to legislate independently on different areas of jurisprudence, which
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includes the right to conceive. It was essential to select those states
that provided the best examples for reflection regarding heterologous
fertilisation techniques and surrogate maternity.
At  this  point  the  discussion  is  conducted  on  two  parallel  planes.
Having identified which State’s legislation is to be examined, each
States’ legislators’ answers to the questions of development of these
new  reproductive  frontiers  is  presented.   The  legal  and  judicial
activities of  the two States  selected California  and Massachusetts,
were studied in depth, and whilst geographically they are very distant
they both have a rather open approach, and in some aspects are not
all that different.
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THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH
TO THE ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION
In 1973 an Australian couple tried to conceive a baby with Artificial
Reproduction  Technique  (ART),  but  the  pregnancy  was  not
successful because of the premature death of embryo caused by an
ectopic pregnancy.1
 On 25 July in the United Kingdom Louise Brown was born, the first
human being conceived using the technique of "In Vitro Fertilisation"
(IVF).
IVF is one of the assisted reproduction techniques offering infertile
couples a chance to conceive a child.
The medical dictionary gives the definition of "In Vitro Fertilisation"
as a process where eggs are fertilized with sperm outside the body.
The  technique  involves  monitoring  and  stimulating  a  woman's
ovulatory process, removing eggs from the ovaries and letting the
sperm fertilize them in a laboratory with the use of a test tube (hence
why it is called "test tube baby"). At the end of the procedure the
fertilized egg, now an embryo, is returned into the woman's uterus.2
This type of fertilisation has continued to be successfully used since
1978  and  has  helped  thousands  of  couples  who  could  not  have
conceived their  own child  naturally  to  have  their  own baby.  This
technique  is  widely  used  today  but  over  the  years  research  and
improvements  in  medicine  have  established  other  Assisted
Reproduction Techniques (ART).
1  http://www.myvmc.com/treatments/in-vitro-fertilisation-ivf/
2  Medical-dictionary, available at: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
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In the  UK there  are  many types  of  techniques  which  include  the
gametes  treatment,  cryopreservation  of  gametes  and  embryos,
techniques of sex selection and the use of surgery to modify or re-
position the reproductive organs, such as the Reverse Vasectomy that
are used. All ART techniques are governed by specific laws in the
UK excluding the "DO IT YOURSELF" fertilisation technique where
people can try to conceive by themselves with no medical assistance.
They may do this by injecting sperm into the uterus, this can be self
administered by a woman, or they may use fertility drugs. The In
Vitro  Techniques  in  which  fertilisation  takes  place  outside  of  the
uterus  are  controlled  and  authorised  by  specific  laws  (in  vitro
maturation - gamete into fallopian transfer - intra cytoplasmic sperm
injection - intrauterine insemination - embryo testing - reproductive
immunology – surrogacy - donation of ova sperm and embryos).3
After the birth of Louise Brown in the UK the debate around the
Fertilisation  Technique became something on which  make a  legal
decision few years later, in 1982, a commission was established to
discuss these new possibilities of conception from the legal point of
view. This commission was called the Warnock Committee after its
President, the philosopher Baroness Mary Warnock.
In the introduction to the Report by the Committee it was stated that:
“Against this background of public excitement and concern,
this Inquiry was established in July 1982, with the following
terms  of  reference:  "To  consider  recent  and  potential
developments  in  medicine  and  science  related  to  human
fertilisation  and  embryology;  to  consider  what  policies  and
safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the
social,  ethical  and legal  implications of  these  developments;
and to make recommendations.".4
3  http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-options.html
4  Report of Warnock Committee at Section. 1.2; 4
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The Warnock Committee recommended the adoption of a legislative
instrument by Parliament to control the use of Assisted Reproduction
Techniques. In fact a direct consequence of the Warnock Report on
the Government  was the  adoption of  the  Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990.5
The  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  1990  represents  a
milestone in bio medical regulation, not only because it provided a
conclusion to the government discussion about the proper approach
to reproductive science, but also because it was the first attempt by
English law to make medical  science democratically accountable.6
The Act  established the  guidelines  by which  the  assisted  medical
fertilisation and the embryological technique could be realized and at
the  same  time  established  an  independent  authority,  the  Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) for the supervision
of  medical  treatments  associated  with  developments  of  the  latest
technologies developments in this area.
HFEA is an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by
the  Department  of  Health.  The  Authority  is  composed  by eleven
members, several are individuals not involved in science or clinical
assisted reproduction and it is organized into several sub-committees
each dealing with a particular topic. In recent years it has also been
used as an instrument for public consultation about important new
medical themes.7
5    Carlo Casonato e Tommaso Edoardo Frosini, La Fecondazione Assistita nel
diritto comparato, Giappichelli Editore, 2006
6   Jonathan  Montgomery,  Rights,  Restraints  and  Pragmatism:  The  Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, July 1991
7     P. Passaglia con contributi di E. Bottini, C. Guerrero Picó, S. Pasetto e M. T. 
Rörig, La Fecondazione Eterologa. Available at: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/CC_SS_fecond
azione_eterologa_201406.pdf
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 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has the power
to  oversee  the  activities  of  health  practitioners  not  only  when
applying the rules established by Parliament but also in creating their
own  standards  as  to  what  is  acceptable  in  these  practices.  That
normative capacity confirms the autonomy of this organ.
The Authority however remains partially under Government control
due  to  some established  rules  which  supervise  the  exercise  of  its
power.8
London's  Parliament  fixed  the  limits  of  what  is  permissible
theoretically,  the HFEA however has the difficult  task of deciding
what  at  a  particular  time  is  permissible  whilst  considering  any
relevant  scientific  improvements  (i.e.  if  it’s  possible  to  reach  the
same goal using other research) and society’s position.
This  modus operandi for the United Kingdom is the right balance
between having fixed boundaries and continuing with the evolution
of medical science.
Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,  the HFEA is
required to give guidance to the licensed centres about "the proper
conduct of activities carried out in pursuance of a license".
This  guidance  is  online  on  the  HFEA website  and  is  part  of  the
HFEA Code of Practice currently in its 8th edition.9
If a licensed clinic infringes the Code it is not considered a crime, but
the Authority takes into account this offense and may not renew or
revoke an authorization for this medical institute.10
8     Jonathan Montgomery, Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; July 1991
9    http://www.hfea.gov.uk/176.html
10   P. Passaglia con contributi di E. Bottini, C. Guerrero Picó, S. Pasetto e M. T. 
Rörig., La Fecondazione Eterologa, Available at: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/CC_SS_fecond
azione_eterologa_201406.pdf
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The clinics that follow the current Code regulation are included in a
directory made by HFEA:  it lists the licensed fertility clinics and
centres carrying out IVF, other assisted reproduction techniques and
human embryo research.
The job of the Authority is to control the work of the UK licensed
clinics. They may carry out periodical inspections when necessary
with the assistance of expertise in the area.
The  Human  Fertilisation  &  Embryology  Authority  keeps  a
confidential  register  of  information  about  donors,  patients  and
treatments.
The register was set up on 1 August 1991 and was created by the
Human Fertilisation  and  Embryology Act.  It  contains  information
concerning the children conceived from licensed treatments from that
date  onward.  Regarding  heterologous  fertilisation,  the  Human
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Authority  (Disclosure  of  Donor
Information) Regulation 2004 removed the possibility of anonymous
donation.
Personal  data  can  be  disclosed  to  the  children  born  using  this
technique once they reach the age of eighteen from April 2005.
It is the right of a child to “to have a name , a nationality and” to
know who are his parents, in the limits that it  is possible,  as was
stated by the United Nations in The Convention on the Rights of the
Child in 1989.11
The same rights are established in the European Charter of the Right
of the Child 1992 SECTION 8.10:
“Every child shall be entitled to protection of his identity and,
if  appropriate,  be  allowed  to  know  certain  circumstances
regarding  his  biological  origin,  subject  to  the  restrictions
imposed by national laws to protect the rights of third persons.
11  The Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 
http://www.unicef.it/Allegati/Convenzione_diritti_infanzia_1.pdf
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Steps must be taken to lay down the conditions under which
the child is to be given information regarding his biological
origin  and  to  protect  the  child  from  divulging  of  this
information by third persons. ”12
Great Britain conformed to these provisions eliminating the complete
anonymity in the donation.
The Authority also keeps a register of clinics’ incidents. Clinic staff
must report any adverse incident to the HFEA within 12 hours of the
event  if  it  is  a serious incident,  and within 24 hours in  all  others
cases. Reporting adverse incidents is a statutory requirement but it is
also done to  avoid the possibility of errors  and their  causes from
recurring.  The  focus  on  errors  and  incidents  is  necessary  to  the
transparency of the clinics and helps raise staff awareness regarding
care and practices used for future cases.13
The Authority has to issue directives in subjects of particular interest
which require particular kind of attention: these are binding for the
clinics involved however there are also other rules that the clinics
need to follow. Some themes undertaken by the HFEA are Multiple
Births; Import and Export of gametes and embryos and Collecting
and recording of information.
For the licensed clinics the Authority provides Consent Forms: these
forms are for the use of patients at the clinic and the record of their
consent to the various aspects of fertility treatment, storage of ova,
sperm and embryos. The consent form is necessary for the prediction
of the Act 1990.14
12  European Charter of Right of  the Child 1992, Resolution A3-0172/92
13   http://www.hfea.gov.uk
14   Schedule 3 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990 A consent to the 
use of any embryo must specify one or more of the following purposes—
     (a) use in providing treatment services to the person giving consent, or that 
person and another specified person together,
(b) use in providing treatment services to persons not including the person 
giving consent, or
13
An  interesting  case  regarding  the  necessary  consent  or  more
specifically the lack of consent is the Blood case of 1997. In the UK
the  first  step  towards  the  practice  of  Assisted  Reproduction
Techniques  is  the  compilation  of  the  consent  form.  If  there  is
something  wrong  or  any  doubts,  a  first  appeal  is  made  to  the
licensing committee. This is essentially a request for a hearing and in
a second time an appeal can be made to the full HFEA. If the last
appeal fails the Act forwards the appeal to the High Court. In almost
all cases the position taken by the Authority prevails.  
The Blood case is an example of a different end of the dispute and it
took Mrs Blood years to reach a conclusion.
R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Ex Parte Diane
Blood  began under these circumstances:  Diane and Stephen Blood
had been married for five years when Stephen died suddenly from
meningitis. Just before life support equipment was removed, Diane
asked the physicians to recover Stephen’s sperm so that she could
conceive his child. She claimed that the couple had been planning a
child before Stephen’s sudden illness.
(c) use for the purposes of any project of research,
and may specify conditions subject to which the embryo may be so used.
(2) A consent to the storage of any gametes or any embryo must—
(a) specify the maximum period of storage (if less than the statutory storage 
period), and
(b) state what is to be done with the gametes or embryo if the person who gave 
the consent dies or is unable because of incapacity to vary the terms of the 
consent or to revoke it,
and may specify conditions subject to which the gametes or embryo may 
remain in storage.
(3) A consent under this Schedule must provide for such other matters as the 
Authority may specify in directions.
(4) A consent under this Schedule may apply—
(a) to the use or storage of a particular embryo, or
(b) in the case of a person providing gametes, to the use or storage of any 
embryo whose creation may be brought about using those gametes,
and in the paragraph (b) case the terms of the consent may be varied, or the 
consent may be withdrawn, in accordance with this Schedule either generally or
in relation to a particular embryo or particular embryos.
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The hospital had an on-staff physician experienced in the technique
of electro-ejaculation and the sperm was removed. HFEA was not
consulted until the procedure was completed.
The HFEA later refused permission to allow the sperm to be used or
stored because Stephen Blood had not given his written consent. Mrs
Blood then petitioned to have the sperm exported to Belgium where
the law allowed her to use the sperm, however the HFEA refused. In
the ensuing litigation, the Court of Appeal ruled for the HFEA on the
issue of written consent but for Mrs Blood on the issue of exportation
concluding  that  the  HFEA’s  refusal  contravened  UE  law15
guaranteeing freedom of movement for goods and medical services.
Overall, the Court of Appeal agreed that the Authority could impose
limits on the export of gametes from the UK, as long as they take
into account a justification of Public interest being at the base of the
ban. In the Blood case they ruled that this reflection was lacking and
for  this  reason  the  decision  of  authority  was  changed  with  the
judgement of the court. Mrs Blood went to Belgium some months
later and gave birth to a son. Several years later she had a second son
thanks to the same procedure. The Blood case stimulated a review of
the  law  regarding  consent  for  gamete  removal.  In  circumstances
where the patient is unconscious but likely to recover and treatment
could cause sterility or when allowing such removal was deemed to
be in the patient’s best interest, removal was possible 16
The legal  battles of Mrs  Blood weren't  finished however,  as  after
having sued to be allowed to use her deceased husband’s sperm; she
15  Cityng the Court of Appeal: Corte di Giustizia UE, case 13.05.2003 n° 385
16 Ian Kennedy & Andrew Grubb, Medical Law 1306 (2000) [citing Sheila           
    McLean, Review of the Common Law Provisions Relating to the Removal of  
   Gametes and of the Consent Provisions in the Human Fertilisation and 
   Embryology Act of 1990 (report to Ministers, July 1998)]
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discovered  that  the  children  had  a  blank  space  on  their  birth
certificates instead of their father’s surname. (2003). The HFE Act
did  not  allow  use  of  the  father’s  surname  because  the  Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 declares that when a child is
conceived using a dead man's sperm he is not to be treated as the
father. This however was overruled when Mrs Blood took her case to
the High Court. She ultimately prevailed in the High Court which
found the Act incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights which requires respect for a person's private and family life.
In this situation the law of the EU had a direct impact on the legal
entitlements to health care of citizens of the European Union.
1. EVOLUTION IN REGULATIONS
The  HFEA  must  be  referred  to  regarding  two  primary  sets  of
legislation: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as
amended) and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.
The 2008 Act is primarily an amending legislation of provisions of
the 1990 Act, which is the main framework governing the duties and
responsibilities  of  the  HFEA.  The  2008  Act  modified  the  1990
original text of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, in the
provisions  relating  to  legal  parenthood  and  access  to  Assisted
Reproduction Treatments.
One of the most important reforms introduced to the original text of
the 1990 Act: it did not limit access to ART to couples only (woman-
man) however in the interpretation of the original Act by medical
staff,  treatments  could  not  be  carried  out  on  the  woman  without
taking into consideration the best interests of the child, who, if born,
would have need for a father. 17
17   Human Fertilisation And Embryology Act 1990, Section 13
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This behaviour which is extremely restricting for singles and lesbian
couples  was  deleted  from  the  2008  Act.  The  Authority  Code  of
Practice now gives  a  detailed explanation of  what  regulations  the
doctor  must  enforce  when  a  person  comes  to  ask  about  Medical
Reproduction Techniques.
The point is to give to the future born good conditions of life with the
parental support that every child deserves. This is done by verifying
the absence in the person/s of alcohol or drug abuse, and of having
committed offences against children.18
This supervision is not simple for a clinic which may not have the
means and proper time necessary to dedicate to these investigations.
There  is  however  the  possibility  that  a  clinic  can  refuse  to  give
clearance  to  access  treatments.  If  this  refusal  comes  from  the
National Health Service hospitals, the patient can ask for a judicial
review, alternatively they can appeal to the Human Right Act under
the European Convention of Human Right.19
18   P. Passaglia con contributi di E. Bottini, C. Guerrero Picó, S. Pasetto e M. T. 
Rörig., La Fecondazione Eterologa. Available at:  
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/CC_SS_fecond
azione_eterologa_201406.pdf
19  In particular the articles of European Convention of Human Right to which the
patients appeal are:
    Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the 
right to marry.
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right
Article 14 a prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
17
In recent years there have been cases regarding prisoners demanding
access  to  the  Assisted  Reproduction  Technique  in  order  to  have
children with their wives.  The last important case was in December
2007, "Dickson v. United Kingdom". Kirk and Lorraine Dickson were
born respectively in 1972 and 1958; in 1994 Kirk was convicted of
murder (kicking a drunk to death) and sentenced to life imprisonment
with a sentence of 15 years. His earliest expected release date was in
2009  and  he  had  no  children.  In  1999  he  met  Lorraine  by
correspondence and in 2001 they married. Since they wished to have
their  own  child,  in  October  2001  Kirk  applied  for  facilities  for
artificial insemination and in 2002 Lorraine joined this application.
In fact for their age it was unlikely that they would be able to have a
child together without the use of artificial insemination techniques.
In a letter dated 28 May 2003 the Secretary of State refused their
application founding his refusal  on the fact that their  relationship,
started in these particular circumstances, had yet to be tested in the
normal environment of daily life. The fact was that any child who
might be conceived would be without the presence of a father for an
important part of his or her childhood. Kirk’s conviction due to his
violent  crime  however,  would  have  been  disregarded  if  he  were
allowed to father a child by artificial insemination.
The  Dicksons  asked  for  a  judicial  review which  went  before  the
Court of Appeal on 30 September 2004, but  the decision was the
same. Their application was unanimously rejected by the Court of
Appeal. Auld LJ relied on principle in the Court of Appeal’s ruling in
the Mellor case.20 In that case (taking into consideration the request
of a prisoner for ART) the Court of Appeal (Lord Phillips) confirmed
the reasons given to justify the restriction of artificial insemination
facilities in exceptional circumstances. As to justification, he agreed
20 R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 3 WLR 533
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with the Ministry policy that the deprivation of the right to conceive
was part and parcel of imprisonment.
This  statement  did  no  more  than  restate  the  Policy,  a  “deliberate
policy that the deprivation of liberty should ordinarily deprive the
prisoner  of  the  opportunity  to  beget  children”.  In  addition  he
considered that there would likely be serious and justifiable public
concern if prisoners continued to have the opportunity to conceive
children while in prison. Lord Phillips agreed that public perception
was a legitimate element of penal policy.
As  a  last  chance  Kirk  and  Lorraine  Dickson  appealed  to  the
European Court of Human Rights twice.
In 2007 in front of the Strasbourg Court sitting as a Grand Chamber,
the  couple’s  reasons  prevailed.  In  their  appeal  the  applicants
complained  about  their  denial  to  access  artificial  insemination
facilities arguing that this breached their right to respect of private
and family life guaranteed by Section 8 and the right to raise a family
under Section 12 of the Convention of Human Rights.
The  Chamber  confirmed  that  persons  continued  to  enjoy  all
Convention rights following conviction except the right to liberty;
therefore  any denial  of  prisoner's  rights  under  Section  8  must  be
justified.  In  the  Dickson's  case  public  concern  as  justification  for
restriction  of  admission  to  the  treatment  of  procreation  was  not
permissible.
The reference to Section 12 of the Convention was not taken into
account because the couple was already satisfied. This new sentence
was supported by twelve votes to five (five dissenting opinions21).22
Following the judicial result of this case, other prisoners began to ask
for admission to the Assisted Reproduction Techniques.
21  dissenting opinion of judges wildhaber, zupančič,  jungwiert, gyulumyan and 
myjer ;
22  http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1050.html
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The 2008 Act also contains some key provisions according to the
Ministry of Health: Firstly the recognition of same-sex couples who
are  not  married/neither  civil  partners,  as  legal  parents  of  children
conceived through the use of donated sperm, eggs or embryos. These
provisions  enable  for  example,  the  civil  partner  of  a  woman who
carries a child with IVF to be recognized as the child’s legal parent
by a parental order. This is a Court order to regulate the parentage
position  for  intended  parents  under  English  law;  however  the
restriction is that one of the petitioners must be genetically related to
the child to apply for a parental order. 23
Other relevant provisions concern banning sex selection of offspring
for non-medical reasons and the possibility to ensure regulation of
"human-admixed" embryos that are created from a combination of
human and animal genetic material for research.
These embryos are created for research purposes to obtain stem cells
and to assist the understanding of disease processes. Even in a liberal
country  such  as  the  UK,  the  idea  to  create  chimeric-embryos  is
something that can have an impact on the public opinion. That is why
recognizing the difficult issue of creating human-admixed embryos,
even if only for research, the HFEA decided in 2007 that a public
consultation  should  be  held  on  the  social  implication  of  creating
these embryos.24
In September 2007 the Authority, after taking into consideration the
results of the consultation,  agreed on a policy for the licensing of
cytoplasmic hybrid research. Today the studies on human-admixed
embryos are illegal except which that are licensed by the Authority.
However growth of human-animal hybrids cannot exceed 14-days,
the  legal  limit  research  on  human  embryos.  It  is  also  illegal  to
23  https://www.gov.uk/become-a-childs-legal-parent
24   the consultation document can be consulted at: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Hybrids_Chimera_review.pdf
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transfer  any human–animal  hybrid  into  either  a  human  or  animal
womb.25
Lastly  in  this  discussion  regarding  Artificial  Reproduction
Techniques  I  would  like  to  consider  the  position  of  those  against
ART, namely those people who object on the basis of the right to
conscientious objection. It is the right of medical and nursing staff in
clinics  performing  these  types  of  treatments,  to  not  actively
participate in the treatments for reasons of personal conscience.
Doctors and Nurses who object can appeal under Section 38 of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 which declares:
(1)No  person  who  has  a  conscientious  objection  to
participating in  any activity  governed  by this  Act  shall  be
under any duty, however arising, to do so.
(2)In  any  legal  proceedings  the  burden  of  proof  of
conscientious objection shall  rest  on the person claiming to
rely on it.
(3)In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement
on oath by any person to the effect that he has a conscientious
objection to participating in a particular activity governed by
this Act shall be sufficient evidence of that fact for the purpose
of discharging the burden of proof imposed by subsection (2)
above.
The  position  of  nurses  and  midwives  who  have  a  conscientious
objection  to  assisting  during  technical  procedures  required  to
conceive a baby is also covered under Section 38(2) of the Human
and Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.26
25   http://www.hfea.gov.uk/519.html
26  http://www.nmc-uk.org/Nurses-and-midwives/Regulation-in-
practice/Regulation-in-Practice-Topics
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When  refusing  to  not  perform  or  assist  in  these  activities  the
conscientious  objectors  must  be  sure  that  they abide  by the  anti-
discrimination provisions included in the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. THE HETEROLOGOUS
FERTILISATION
The definition of In Vitro Fertilisation has already been given as well
as  that  of  other  techniques  accepted  as  artificial  reproduction
techniques under United Kingdom law.
When we hold about  Heterologous Fertilisation,  we refer to these
procedures but involving sperm and oocyte from donors.
The UK is very open-minded and often observes experiences of other
European countries in Assisted Reproduction, in particular regarding
the use of donors' gametes. In England the donation of sperm and
oocytes fertilized and unfertilized is allowed.
Although  donation  of  semen  for  artificial  insemination  does  not
generally  raise  any  problems,  in  several  countries  we  can  find
restrictive  legislation.  In  Austria  the  federal  law  on  assisted
reproduction (1992) allows recourse to the seed of a third only in
exceptional cases.
Whilst in Switzerland the ethical guidelines on assisted reproduction
and health in the federal regulation bill concerning IVF only allows
married couples to benefit from the donation of sperm from a third
party (n. 3.2, Art. 3.3)27.
27   http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/la-fecondazione-assistita-una-sintesi-
comparativa_(Frontiere-della-Vita)
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 With the donation of female gametes we find more difficulties in
European countries such as in the more liberal countries like Norway
which  only  allow  in  vitro  fertilization  with  eggs  and  semen
belonging to the same couple.
The  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  of  1990  admitted
heterologous fertilisation, because here the law focus its attention not
on pre-established criteria, but on providing for the welfare of the
child born from the treatment.
In  England  the  access  to  Assisted  Reproduction  Techniques  both
homologous and heterologous is  permitted to married couples28 or
civil partners29, as well as singles (women and man).30
28   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, section 49:
      Meaning of references to parties to a marriage
     (1) The references in sections 35 to 47 to the parties to a marriage at any time    
there referred to—
     (a) are to the parties to a marriage subsisting at that time, unless a judicial   
separation was then in force, but
     (b) include the parties to a void marriage if either or both of them reasonably 
believed at that time that the marriage was valid; and for the purposes of those 
sections it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that one of them 
reasonably believed at that time that the marriage was valid.
     (2) In subsection (1) (a) “judicial separation” includes a legal separation 
obtained in a country outside the British Islands and recognized in the United 
Kingdom.
29   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, section 50:
      Meaning of references to parties to a civil partnership
    (1) The references in sections 35 to 47 to the parties to a civil partnership at any 
time there referred to—
    (a) are to the parties to a civil partnership subsisting at that time, unless a 
separation order was then in force, but
    (b) include the parties to a void civil partnership if either or both of them 
reasonably believed at that time that the civil partnership was valid; and for the 
purposes of those sections it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, 
that one of them reasonably believed at that time that the civil partnership was 
valid.
     (2) The reference in section 48(6) (b) to a civil partnership includes a reference 
to a void civil partnership if either or both of the parties reasonably believed at 
the time when they registered as civil partners of each other that the civil 
partnership was valid; and for this purpose it is to be presumed, unless the 
contrary is shown, that one of them reasonably believed at that time that the 
civil partnership was valid.
30   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 27:
      Meaning of  “mother”; section 28: Meaning of "father"  and amendments from 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Sections 33 to 47
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There are no legislative restrictions on the age a women is eligible to
receive  IVF treatment.  The National  Health  System,  which  is  the
social  publicly-funded health care system in the UK that provides
health  care  to  anyone  normally  residing  in  the  UK,  issues
recommendations that might pragmatically limit  the availability of
treatment for women aged 40/45 years or older.
The  problem  that  the  British  policy  faced  with  the  practice  of
heterologous fertilisation was the parenthood relationship,  because
genetically the baby born was not in a blood relationship with one or
sometimes  both  parents.  The  2008  Act  revised  this  particular
situation, modifying the laws about affiliation. These rules entered
into force in April 2009.
The provisions previously referring to married couples now also refer
to gay couples. This is due to the same-sex marriage legislation being
passed by the Parliament in July 2013 and coming into force on 13
March 2014 in England and Wales.31  
There are some differences however between the application of the
common law provisions and this Bill, in particular when we take into
account the matter of parenthood.
In fact  the common law "presumption  of  legitimacy"  that  a  child
born to a woman during her marriage is also the child of her husband
is not extended by Clause 11 to the same-sex married couple. The
explanatory notes by Parliament refer to the case when two women
are married to each other and one of them has a baby, her wife is not
the  presumed  other  parent  of  the  child.  There  are  derogations  in
common law for the other woman in the marriage who does not give
birth to become the legal parent of the baby: for example, in section
42 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 as amended
by paragraph 36 of Schedule 7 of the Marriage (same sex) Act.
31   Look at Parliament's explanatory note to bill , Clause 11, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-
2013/0126/en/2013126en.htm
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The  provisions  concerning  Adoption  are  amended  by  the  2013
Marriage Act: the Adoption and Children Act 2002 provides for the
meaning of "a couple" for the purposes of that Act:
"In this Act, a couple means-
(a) a married couple, or
(aa) two people who are civil partners of each other, or
(b)  two people  (whether  of  different  sexes  or  the  same sex)
living as partners in an enduring family relationship." 32
2.1 DONATION AND DONOR ANONYMITY
In the UK, a donation using the Artificial Reproduction Techniques
includes eggs, sperms and embryos.
The donations have to be made in clinics licensed with the HFEA
and these clinics and all the information about their donors are held
by  the  National  Gamete  Donation  Trust,  a  government-funded
charity. The Trust aims to raise awareness and seek ways to alleviate
the national shortage of gamete (sperm, egg and embryo) donors.
The gametes can be donated to help infertile people to have children
of their own (around 2,000 children are born every year in the UK
using donated eggs, sperm or embryos33), but can also be used for
research purposes.34
Making a donation in a licensed clinic puts both donor and receiver
in a safe medical position because gametes donated through a clinic
must be screened for various medical conditions. Sperm and embryos
32   http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-
2013/0126/en/2013126en.htm
33  http://www.hfea.gov.uk/egg-and-sperm-donation.html
34  The HFEA have only issued one clinic a license to research on donated eggs to 
create embryos. This was granted to the Newcastle Fertility Centre at Life.
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are also quarantined for six months.  This helps ensure that babies
born from donations are healthy and there are no risks for the women
who  receive  them.  The  importance  to  use  HFEA recommended
clinics is widely promoted because in England and other countries
there are many websites which eluding the law, contact women who
wish to conceive a baby with voluntary sperm donors, with no legal
or  medical  supervision.  Using  this  kind  of  donation  can  put  the
woman’s health and that of the unborn child in danger because of the
lack of  medical  supervision.  Other issues may arise  regarding the
donor and his eventual claim to rights over the baby to be born as he
is considered to be the legal father, and if this man is not a registered
donor, the child may never know the identity of his biological parent.
2.1.1 REQUIREMENT TO DONATE
In  order  to  become a  donor  people  need to  fulfil  certain  criteria.
These criteria  are  established to  minimize the  risk of  transmitting
infections to the women receiving the donation, or genetic diseases
or malformations to any children born.
It is a legal requirement for the donors to consent in writing before
donating. The consent can be changed or withdrawn at any time up to
the point at which the gametes are used in treatment.35
To become a sperm donor there is  an age  limit  which  the HFEA
modified in 2012. The Authority reduced the legal age at which a
man can continue  to  donate  his  sperm from 45 to  41  years.  The
reason was to avoid the transmittal of genetic abnormalities, a risk
which increases when the men who donate are over 40 years of age.
The sperm donor must submit to a screening test in order to verify
that  he  is  free  of  serious  medical  disabilities  and  has  no  family
history of inherited disorders. He also makes a commitment to keep
35   http://www.hfea.gov.uk/egg-and-sperm-donors.html
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in touch with the clinic a few times a week, over a period of several
months.
The number of children that can be born from using a donor sperm is
regulated by law, therefore a centre would not accept any man as a
donor, if he has previously donated in another clinic.
The age limit to become an egg donor is between 18 and 35 years
old.  Women need  to  be  free  of  any serious  medical  problems  or
disabilities and have no history of congenital,  family or hereditary
disease. As with the sperm donors, they must undergo medical tests
to verify their health status. It is interesting to note that even a sterile
woman can donate her gametes, if she still has her ovaries.36
For  women  some  clinics  offer  "egg-sharing"  programs.  Women
undertaking fertility treatments may produce surplus eggs and share
these with other women unable to produce them, so both parties have
a chance at becoming pregnant.37 Clinics may allow women who are
eligible to become egg sharers the advantage of using this as a way to
subsidise or be provided with free IVF treatment.
The Authority decided that a donor can create up to 10 families with
their  donations  to  avoid  the  risk  of  consanguineous  relationships
between offspring and related welfare problems. There is no limit to
the  number  of  cycles  they  can  participate  in  and  no  limit  to  the
number of children created within those 10 family units.38
In the end the criteria for embryo donation is the same, taking into
account  the individual gametes (egg and sperm) of the donors.  In
exceptional circumstances a clinic may accept donors outside the age
36    http://www.ngdt.co.uk
37    IVF treatment begins with stimulation of the ovaries to produce eggs. 
Generally, the result is the production of between 10-12 eggs, but UK law 
allows only one or two embryos to be transferred to the uterus. Remaining 
embryos can be frozen, but in most cases not all are used. Citing : 
http://www.eggsharing.com
38   14 July 2011 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority decision in 
donation policies. Finding at :http://www.ngdt.co.uk
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bracket if the numbers of embryo donations are smaller than that of
gametes donations.39
Embryos are usually donated by couples who have successfully had
their baby from IVF and want to help other couples.
A case that has provoked much discussion regarding the conservation
and use of embryos is the  “Evans v. United Kingdom”40. Here the
case did not take into account the donation of the embryo, but the
importance of the consensus to use this embryo. Consensus that, as
we have said, must be present both at the time of the donation and at
the moment of use of the techniques of artificial reproduction.
In October 2001 Natallie Evans and Howard Johnston got engaged.
During  an  appointment  at  a  fertility  treatment  clinic  they  were
encouraged by the clinic to undergo IVF treatment prior to surgical
removal of Ms Evans ovaries as she had been diagnosed with a pre-
cancerous condition of the ovaries. As a result of the treatments six
embryos were created and frozen from the gametes of both partners,
Natallie and Howard. In accordance with the rules established in the
1990 Act, prior to the creation and storage Evans and her partner
signed  off  on  their  consent  and  were  informed  that  it  would  be
possible  for  either  of  them to  withdraw this  consent  at  any time
before the embryos were implanted in the woman's uterus.
On  26  November  2001,  Miss  Evans  underwent  an  operation  to
remove her ovaries, so the frozen embryos were the only chance for
her to conceive her own children. After the operation she was told
she would need to wait for two years before the implantation of the
embryos in her  uterus.  Unfortunately the relationship between Mr
Johnston and Miss Evans ended in 2002 and a few months later he
wrote to the clinic storing the embryos, asking that they be destroyed.
39   Births following donor conception treatment, statistic make by HFEA, 
viewable at: http://www.hfea.gov.uk/donor-conception-births.html
40    European Court of Human Right sitting as a Grand Chamber; case Evans v. 
United Kingdom; application no. 6339/05, 10 April 2007
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When the clinic informed Miss Evans of this request,  because the
Authority established that both parties have to be informed before
embryos  are  destroyed,  she  began  legal  proceedings  in  the  High
Court  and  in  2004  at  the  Court  of  Appeal.  The  British  judges
however ruled in favour of Mr Johnston.41
The  High  Court’s  sentence42 was  based  on  the  change  of
circumstances  that  occurred  after  he  had  given  his  consent,  in
accordance  with  the  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology Act  of
1990, schedule 3.43 It also cited that there was no violation of rights
to apply to this situation as all patients undergoing IVF treatment,
irrespective of their sex, should be treated the same:
“If a man has testicular cancer and his sperm, preserved prior
to radical surgery which renders him permanently infertile, is
used to create embryos with his partner; and if the couple have
separated before the embryos are transferred into the woman,
nobody  would  suggest  that  she  could  not  withdraw  her
consent  to  treatment  and  refuse  to  have  the  embryos
transferred  into  her.  The  statutory  provisions,  like
Convention rights, apply to men and women equally.”
In the decision of the Court of Appeal44 we can find almost the same
premise on which Miss Evan’s request was rejected. Here the judges
made a comparison between the fertile and infertile woman, but did
not all  agree as to what was the right comparison to refer  to:  for
Lords  Justices  Thorpe  and  Sedley  the  comparison  was  “between
41    In 2003 the High Court of Justice; the refusal is confirmed in June 2004 by 
the Court of Appeal and in November of the same year; the Law Lords prevents
Natallie arriving at the House of Lords
42   Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam)
43   http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37/schedule/3
44   Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Cit 727
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women  seeking  IVF  treatment  whose  partners  had  withdrawn
consent and those whose partners had not done so”; and for  Lady
Justice  Arden  the  comparison  was  between  “fertile  and  infertile
women, since the genetic father had the possibility of withdrawing
consent to IVF at a later stage than in ordinary sexual intercourse”.
The judges agreed that which ever interpretation was decided upon,
the  difference  in  treatment  was  justified  and  proportionate  under
Article 14 of the Convention for the same reasons that underline the
finding of no violation of Article 8. In addition they did not find the
embryos were not entitled to protection under Article 2, since under
domestic law an embryo is not recognized as having any rights up to
the moment of birth.
The Court knew this was the last chance for Natallie to have her own
baby, however they retained she could use an egg or other embryo
donation  to  conceive  a  baby,  even  if  it  would  not  be  genetically
related to her.
As  a  last  chance,  Miss  Evans  brought  her  case  in  front  of  the
European Court of Human Rights, claiming a violation of rights 2, 8,
14  of  the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and
Fundamental  Freedoms.45 The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,
sitting as a Grand Chamber deliberated in March 2007.
The  only  thing  that  Miss  Evans  achieved  initially  was  the
preservation  of  the  embryos  until  the  court  had  completed  its
examination of the case under rule 39 of The Rules of Court.46
45   http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
46   Article 39 – Interim measures
     “1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a 
party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the 
parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the 
interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.
      2. Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted
in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.
     3. The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter 
connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.”
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Miss  Evans  also  appealed  to  a  violation  of  the  Right  of  Life
according to Article 2:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
2.  Deprivation  of  life  shall  not  be  regarded  as  inflicted  in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
a.              in defence of any person from unlawful
violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the      
escape of a person lawfully detained;
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a
riot or insurrection.
Taking into consideration Article 2 could mean that the embryo has
the right to life as a human being. In fact the Court recalled that the
issue of when the right  to  life began comes within the margin of
appreciation of the State concerned. Under English law an embryo
does not have independent rights and could not claim a right to life
under Article 2, so there was not a violation of this article.
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
1. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of  national  security,  public safety or  the  economic
well-being of  the  country,  for  the  prevention of  disorder  or
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crime,  for  the  protection  of  health  or  morals,  or  for  the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In this case the problem was to find a balance between the right for
privacy  of  Mr  Johnston  and  the  right  to  create  a  family,  which
involved both of them. Natalie desire to become a mother of her own
babies and Mr Johnston right to not have a family with Miss Evans.
The Grand Chamber agreed that Article 8 was applicable in this case
because the “right of a private life” includes the right to respect for
both parties in the decision to become or not become a parent. The
question is:
“Whether  there  exists  a  positive  obligation on the  State  to
ensure that a woman who has embarked on treatment for the
specific purpose of giving birth to a genetically related child
should be permitted to proceed to implantation of the embryo
not with standing the withdrawal of consent by her former
partner, the male gamete provider”
Once  there  was  no  European  law  regulating  IVF  treatments  and
consent for the use of embryos, the Court had to refer to the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990. The Court found in the
UK  Act  a  very  detailed  legislation  which  effectively  balanced
competing  public  and  private  interests.  Taking  into  account  the
sections  regarding   embryos,  Schedule  3  of  1990  Act:  the  Court
referred to the storage of embryos for a period of no more than ten
years and the legal standing to not continue storage if the woman was
passed  the  age  limit  to  be  subjected  to  the  treatment.  Upon
completion  of  the  provision,  there  was reference  to  the  necessary
written consent for each gamete provider: paragraph 4 of Schedule 3
provides that:
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 “the terms of any consent under this Schedule may from time
to  time  be  varied,  and  the  consent  may  be  withdrawn,  by
notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person
keeping the gametes or embryo ...” up until the point that the
embryo has been implanted in the uterus.
Miss  Evans  here  submitted  that  it  was  neither  necessary  nor  in
proportion to  the situation to give such power to  a single gamete
provider.  The  Court,  making  a  comparison  with  other  European
countries, underlined that the UK was not the only country to grant
both parties of IVF treatment the right to withdraw consent for the
use or storage of their  gametes at  any stage up to the moment of
embryo  implantation.  The  United  Kingdom  did  not  exceed  the
margin  of  appreciation  afforded  to  it  or  upset  the  fair  balance
required under Article 8, so there was no reason to find a violation of
the rights under this Article.
 Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of  the  rights  and freedoms set  forth in this
Convention shall  be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
Miss Evans complained of discrimination contrary to Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8. She complained about unequal treatment
of herself and any other women in the same position subjected to
treatment  of  assisted  reproduction.  For  the  Grand  Chamber  the
reasons given for finding that there was no violation of Article 8 also
afforded a reasonable and objective justification under Article 14.
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Once again there was no violation of any Conventions.47
This decision which provoked much discussion had a big impact on
fertility laws in the UK and other countries.
2.1.2 COMPENSATION
The  HFEA in  the  Code  of  Practice  has  underlined  a  guide  for
compensation  to  be  given  to  donors. These  new  limits  were
introduced in April 2012, as a result of a public consultation made in
2011.48 Clinics  are  now able  to  offer  donors  compensation  which
better reflect their expenses. For sperm and embryo donors the limit
is a fixed sum of £35 per clinic visit including expenses, and for egg
donors  the  limit  is  a  fixed  sum  of  £750  per  cycle  of  donation,
including expenses. Other form of donation under payment is illegal
in  the  UK.  England's  clinics  cannot  bring  in  donors  from  other
countries, however they can import eggs and sperm from abroad49, in
this case the donors whose sperm or eggs are imported in the UK had
the same compensation as they could be UK donors.
Looking at other European countries we can see that almost all laws
regarding this theme are the same. The only difference is that in some
countries,  the donors compensation is  higher  than in  England (for
example  in  Cyprus  the  compensation  payment  is  highest  and
donation costs are very low compared to the UK50).
47    For the no violation of the Articles 8; 14 the judges votes were thirteen to 
four. The dissenting judges were: TÜRMEN, TSATSA-NIKOLOVSKA, 
SPIELMANN AND ZIEMELE
48    See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/5605.html
49   Currently about 20% of sperm donors and 2% of egg donors are from 
overseas, compared to 12% and 4%, respectively, in 2005. Data of 2013 from 
“Donating sperm and eggs. Have your say...” Text sourced from: 
www.hfea.gov.uk/donationreview
50    http://www.fertilityclinicsabroad.com/ivf-cyprus.html
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In  the  European  Union  an  open  commercial  trade  in  gametes  or
embryos  is  apparently  not  openly  permitted.  Member  states  are
enjoined by the EU Tissues and Cells Directive to see that these are
donated  voluntarily,  and  money  cannot  change  hands  unless
payments  are  “strictly  limited  to  making  good  the  expenses  and
inconveniences of donation”.51
2.1.3 REMOVAL OF ANONYMITY
For the first time in 2004 the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority took into account the topic of the anonymous donation and
decided that as a result of the growing use of ART, it was important
to  let   the  children  conceived  by these  methods  know something
about  their  genetic  origin.  For  this  purpose  the  HFEA issued  the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor
Information) Regulation 2004.52 The new regulation came into force
on 1 April 2005. The donors of sperm, eggs or embryos after this date
are by law, identifiable.
 Any person born as a result of a donation after this time is entitled to
request and receive their donor’s name and last known address, once
they reach the age of 18.
This new regulation is not retrospective, so those who donated before
1  April  are  protected  by  anonymity.  If  the  conceived  child  asks
something about  his  gamete's  donor,  the  HFEA is  not  allowed to
reveal any identifying information.
It is important to know that the donor has no legal right to contact the
babies who are born as a result of his/her donation. That right and
decision  belongs  only  to  the  child.  The  reason  is  obviously
understandable,  some  children  are  not  aware  they  have  been
51   EC Directive 2004/23/EC of 31 March 2004
52  Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/1511/regulation/1/made
35
conceived from a donation and if contact is allowed from either of
the donors, the legal parent who may have chosen anonymity would
be find out.
A donor who has donated before that date wanted to be known, it is
possible. The HFEA gives the opportunity for removal of anonymity;
however the donor must request the HFEA to re-register them as an
identifiable donor.
A second  intervention  to  regulate  the  donation  of  embryos  and
gametes can be found in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 2008, Section 24.53
Firstly  this  contains  a  reduction  of  the  age  at  which  donors  can
request  information about donor and genetic parentage : at the age of
16 years the donor-conceived child can seek information about the
number, sex and year of birth of their 'half-siblings' conceived using
gametes of the same donor but not information regarding the 'donor's
legal children'. The donor-conceived child can also seek information
as to  whether  or not they are genetically related to  someone they
intend to marry, enter a civil partnership or have intimate physical
relationship with. Before 18 years of age “regulations cannot require
the Authority to give the applicant any information which identifies
the  donor”.  Following  the  removal  of  donor  anonymity  in  April
2005,  there  is  an  interested  provisions  of  point  6,  section  31ZA
regarding “Request for information as to genetic parentage etc. “of
Section  24.  This  states  that  the  HFEA has  the  power  but  is  not
obliged  to  inform  donors  that  identifying  information  has  been
applied for, however they cannot disclose the identity of the person
seeking it.
Since  removal  of  anonymity  the  UK  has  seen  a  reduction  in
donations (in particular egg donations had an immediate and steep
fall in the number of donors, whilst men registering as sperm donors
53  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/section/24
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rose by 6% in the year following this  law) as can be seen in  the
HFEA  statistics.54 Several  studies  regarding  potential  new
identifiable donors explain some of the reasons as to why they may
or may not donate their gametes: emotional liability was cited nearly
as  much  (8.4%) as  financial  liability  (10.8%).  The spectre  of  the
offspring “knocking on the door 18 years later” and the impact of any
contact on the donor’s family was frequently mentioned, being able
to identify the gamete donor obviously allows this  possibility and
some  gave  this  as  a  reason  for  not  donating.  Donors  themselves
suggested a possible solution for these problems could be to set up
support  systems  to  oversee  contact  between  donors  and  donor
offspring and to provide general ongoing support.
Likewise the British Fertility Society in its response to the HFEA’s
consultation on donor-assisted conception has  also highlighted the
need to provide support for those donating non-anonymously.
In 1988 to help infertile people and couples who were considering
fertility treatments,  the British Government  established the British
Infertility  Counselling  Association  (BICA).  This  is  the  only
professional association for infertility counsellors and counselling in
the UK.55
There is no similar body for the other participants of ART, namely
the donors. To fill this void the government commissioned the BICA
to undertake some preliminary work on the provision of counselling
services for donors and conceived children in circumstances such as
when they request information about their genetic origins from the
HFEA  Register  of  Information.  Unfortunately  these
recommendations were not acted upon. The reason could have been
that  the  children  conceived  would  not  be  requesting  information
about their non-anonymous donors until 2023, therefore it was not an
54   http://www.hfea.gov.uk/donor-conception-treatments.html
55   http://www.bica.net/
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immediate problem to be resolved and any small issue in this highly
sensitive  area  could  frighten  potential  donors  from donating  their
gametes.56 The  British  Fertility  Society  in  2005  did  provided  a
solution  for  increasing  the  number  of  donations  through  a  donor
recruitment campaign:
“Plan for counselling and support service in place for future
enquiries,  including  services  around  times  of  information
sharing and/or contact with donor-conceived offspring”57
The  most  recent  recruitment  campaigns  unfortunately  have  not
followed  these  guidelines,  preferring  to  focus  on  the  emotional
aspect  of  the  donation.  For  example  the  London  sperm  bank  in
March 2010, decided to  focus  on recruiting altruistic,  emotionally
mature men who wanted to do something kind to help others. Other
publicity has used the power of the media: journalists often contact
the National Gamete Donation Trust to speak to donors to see if they
would like to tell their stories. The Trust created a special page on its
website dedicated to the media request to facilitate these contacts.58
This narration using the media keeps donations in the public eye and
over time have helped recruit more donors.
56   Lucy Frith, Eric Blyth and Abigail Farrand, UK gamete donors’ reflections on 
the removal of anonymity: implications for recruitment. From Human 
Reproduction Vol.22, No.6 pp.1675-1680, 2007. Available at:
      http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org
57   British Fertility Society response to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority public consultation on The Regulation of  Donor-Assisted 
Conception, February 2005. Available at: 
http://www.fertility.org.uk/practicepolicy/index.html
58   http://www.ngdt.co.uk/media-request
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2.2 THE QUESTION OF PATERNITY AND
MATERNITY
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 defines who are
the legal parents of the child born after a fertility treatment under
English law. Concerning same-sex married couples and civil partners
there  are  no  differences  in  the  law  applied  to  either  of  them.
Following amendments  to  the  1990 Act,  of  September  2009 both
parties of these couples can be the legal parents of the children born
as a result of artificial insemination.
The woman who conceives  the  baby is  always  the  mother.59 The
genetic link with the child however is not recognized but rather the
gestational  link,  this  is  what  is  called  “Gestational  Surrogacy”60.
There  are  other  ways  under  English  law  for  another  woman  to
become the legal parent, but generally this is the provision.
The  degree  of  legal  relationship  with  the  other  parent,  male  or
female, it depends on the way in which insemination occurred.61
As we have seen for private insemination with a “Do It Yourself”
technique, there are not UK laws against it. However when a woman
decides to apply this type of insemination, the parenthood link to the
conceived baby must be taken into consideration.
59   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008; Section 33:
      Meaning of “mother”
     (1) The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing 
in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated 
as the mother of the child.
     (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any child to the extent that the child is 
treated by virtue of adoption as not being the woman's child.
     (3) Subsection (1) applies whether the woman was in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs.
60    The gestational surrogacy, the pregnancy results from the transfer of an 
embryo created by in vitro fertilisation (IVF), in a manner so the resulting child
is genetically unrelated to the surrogate. From: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrogacy
61   http://www.hfea.gov.uk/399.html?fldSearchFor=paternity
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The legal paternity depends on whether the relationship between the
mother and her partner falls under the provisions of Section 3562 or
Section 4263 (for the same sex couples) of the 2008 Act. If it is under
one of these rules the mother’s husband or civil  partner (if it  is a
woman)  will  be  the  child’s  legal  father  or  second  parent  and the
biological father has no legal connection with the child. For same-sex
couples the insemination must have been after April 2009. If it took
place  before  then  the  old  law  applies  and  the  sperm  donor  is
recognized as the legal father.
When the relationship is not protected by the Act the donor is the
legal father of the conceived child and the mother's partner has no
legal relationship with the baby born, it can only be created through
an adoption or parental order. Both require a formal court order. The
biological father in these cases would cease to be the legal parent
because under UK law, a child can only have two parents.
62   Human Fetilisation And Embryology Act 2008, Section 35:
     Woman married at time of treatment
     (1) If—
      (a) at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or of the sperm and eggs or 
of her artificial insemination, W was a party to a marriage, and
      (b) the creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the 
sperm of the other party to the marriage,
      then, subject to section 38(2) to (4), the other party to the marriage is to be 
treated as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the
placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial 
insemination (as the case may be).
     (2) This section applies whether W was in the United Kingdom or elsewhere at 
the time mentioned in subsection (1)(a).
63    Human Fetilisation And Embryology Act 2008, Section 42:
      Woman in civil partnership at time of treatment
     (1) If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of 
her artificial insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership, then subject to 
section 45(2) to (4), the other party to the civil partnership is to be treated as a 
parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing in 
W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination (as the 
case may be).
     (2) This section applies whether W was in the United Kingdom or elsewhere at 
the time mentioned in subsection (1).
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If conception occurs after treatment in a UK licensed clinic, other
rules apply. The centre should provide information to people seeking
treatment  about  legal  parenthood or  should direct  those people  to
suitable sources of information. This information should include who
will be the child’s legal parents under the HFE Act 2008 and other
relevant legislation.
The  partner  of  the  legal  mother  who  agreed  to  the  treatment  is
considered to be the parent of the baby, be they male or female. If
they are married or in a civil partnership, he/she will automatically
become the second parent of the baby but not his father or mother. If
they are not married or in a civil partnership, he or she, will only be
recognized as a donor, unless the two participating parties have given
their  prior  written  consent.  Any  other  circumstances  must  be
formalised by the Court. The different title of “other parent” is the
only difference because the parenthood legal duties are the same as
those of the father or mother. The most important thing is to agree on
the consent form to the procedure. When a couple, married or not
goes  to  a  registered  clinic  to  undergo  IVF  treatment  involving  a
donor, both parties must fill out the consent form. On the form the
mother must declare the name of the partner that she wants to be the
legal  parent  of  the  conceived  child.  In  this  situation  with  the
continued  persistence  of  consent  until  the  end  of  treatment,  the
partner of the woman will be the legal father of every child born as a
result  of said treatment.  Of course a single woman can choose to
undergo treatment alone and in this case, there will be no legal father
(unless  the  donor  expresses  the  desire  to  also  become  the  legal
father)  of  the  child  registered  on  the  birth  certificate.  The  same
situation occurs when the civil partner or the husband of the mother
does not agree with the procedure. In these circumstances, the burden
of proof is in the hands of the husband of the couple, there is the
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legal  presumption  that  children  born  in  wedlock  are  those  of  the
husband and therefore he is their father.64
It is interesting to see that the law does not say anything about the
relationship between  the  two  people  who  want  to  undergo  the
procedure of artificial insemination. The only limit is that they are
not linked by a bond of kinship. They can just be two friends with a
desire  to  have a  baby.  The law favours  married couples  and civil
partners, as already seen. Furthermore, under the law, fertilisation by
husbands or civil  partners through use of their  gametes after their
death, allows them to become parents of any child born thereafter.65
2.2.1 THE PARTICULAR CASE OF
TRANSEXUAL PARENTHOOD
Artificial reproduction techniques can also help the transgender who
has the desire to have a baby, by giving them the possibility to store
eggs or sperm for future use before the change of sex.
They must store eggs or sperm in anticipation of hormone therapy or
surgery that will render them 'prematurely infertile'. In this particular
case it is also possible to extend the storage period from ten years up
to a maximum of 55 years.
The  provision  which  ensures  in  some  way  parenthood  of
transgender’s  children  is  covered  under  Section  12  of  the  Gender
Recognition Act 200466 which states:
64   It is a common law presumption. From Cristine Rossini, English As a Legal 
Language
65 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Section 40
66 Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/contents
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 The  fact  that  a  person's  gender  has  become  the  acquired
gender under this Act does not affect the status of the person
as the mother or father of a child.
If  they  have  children  before  they  legally  change  gender,  this
provision protects the existing legal parenthood. Therefore they can
remain the legal father or mother of the children just as they were,
before the change of sex. There is no clear provision for transgender
parents  who  conceive  after  having  transitioned  and  the  Human
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  does  not  say  anything  in  this
particular  case.  It  is  possible  to  apply  Section  12  of  the  Gender
Recognition Act also to these cases, but the problem remains that if
the  genders  use  their  own  gametes  for  treatment,  because  of  the
change of the sex, it is possible that they could be simply considered
as a donor. Under Section 12, for example, a man, who has become a
woman but used his sperm to conceive with his partner, if married or
in  a  civil  partnership,  would  only  be  classified  the  second  legal
parent  of  the  baby but  not  his  father.  Transexual  parents  wish  to
claim parenthood status that they have under their previous gender,
as a mother if they had become a man and as a father if they had
become a woman. The issue of parental bond for those who conceive
after a gender transition has not yet  been legally tried in any UK
court to date.
2.3 THE CLINICS PAY ATTENTION BUT
SOMETIMES MISTAKES HAPPEN
A licensed  clinic  must  clearly  state  the  safe,  legal  and  medical
practices to any party that applies to them, sometimes however the
clinics do commit mistakes.
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To  decrease  the  number  of  these  errors  the  HFEA  has  begun
monitoring the clinics and publishes reports on adverse incidents in
fertility clinics. The latest figures are from 8 July 2014, where the
Authority reported:
• The overall number of incidents reported remains steady
• Only three serious ‘grade A’ incidents were reported in three   
            years
• Avoidable ‘grade C’ incidents remained too high, incidents
            reported67
The Authority in the Report classified the clinic incidents in three
categories,  depending  on  the  degree  of  seriousness.  Grade  A
incidents were regarded as the most serious and Grade C the least.
There were also two other areas: ‘near misses’ and ‘not incidents’.
These were not considered real incidents but unplanned events that
did not result in injury, illness, or damage and events that did not fall
within the HFEA's definition of  incidents.  However  incidents that
caused loss or damage to the patient, gamete and embryos or clinic
staff.
The real grades of clinic incidents are A, B, and C:
• Grade A incidents, for example where a patient is implanted
with  someone  else’s  embryo  are  investigated  immediately
upon  being  reported.  The  process  includes  an  on-site
inspection and a report  is  passed onto the HFEA’s Licence
Committee.
• Grade B incidents are where all  of a patient’s  embryos are
lost. These incidents are investigated by the clinic and then
reported to the HFEA within 10 working days after which the
67  http://www.hfea.gov.uk/9017.html
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inspection  team  decides,  based  on  the  facts,  whether  an
inspection is required.
• Grade  C  incidents  where  one  of  a  patient’s  eggs  may  be
rendered unusable but others remain, making her opportunity
for  treatment  still  viable,  are  investigated  by the  clinic.  A
report must be produced by the clinic, to the HFEA although
not necessarily submitted for assessment.68
 The Number of incidents reported to the HFEA between 1 January
2010 and 31 December 2012
The  figure  realized  from  data  of  “Adverse  incidents  in  fertility
clinics:  lessons  to  learn  2010-2012”69,  contains  the  result  of  how
many incidents were reported to HFEA and how severe they were.
About 60,000 cycles of fertility treatment are carried out in the UK
annually70, this suggests that an estimated 1% of cycles are affected
by some sort of adverse incident. As we can see just three cases of
Grade  A incidents  were  found which  were  the  removal  of  frozen
sperm from storage within its consent period, the contamination of 11
patient cellular debris that may have contained sperm, and in 2012
regard a family seeking to have treatment with donor sperm in order
to have a genetically related sibling were instead given sperm from a
different donor so they had two genetic fathers to their sibling.
A similar case of interest from a juridical point of view occurred in
another situation of a Grade A incident: the A (A Minor) & Ors v A
68  http://www.hfea.gov.uk/9017.html
69   Available at: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Adverse_incidents_in_fertility_clinics_2010-
2012_-_lessons_to_learn.pdf
70   Report of HFEA; Fertility Treatments in 2011: Trends and Figures  
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Health  &  Social  Services  Trust  [2010]  NIQB  10871.  In  this
noteworthy  case  the  circumstances  of  the  court  case  were  very
different from all  precedents.  Here in fact the applicants were the
minors, the children conceived under the treatment. It was not a case
of civil liability against the clinic on behalf of the parents caused by
an  adverse  clinical  incident,  that  liability  had  already  been
recognized by the medical centre to parents. In this case the centre
refused to recognize responsibility toward the minors.
The plaintiffs,  A and B,  are  the  children  born  as  a  result  of  IVF
treatment provided by the clinic to the plaintiffs' mother.
What is the problem in the procedure? The parent of the applicants
had  explicitly  asked  the  medical  centre  that  assisted  fertilization
happen with gametes that allowed future children to have their same
skin colour “Caucasian” or white. In fact following normal practice
the  mothers'  eggs  were  supposed to  be  inseminated  with  donated
sperm from a same skin colour’s donor, unless a special request is
made for them. The error of the medical centre was to have fertilized
eggs of the mother of the applicants with male gametes marked by
the  nomenclature  "Caucasian  (Cape  coloured)",  which  refers  to  a
South African community including different skin colours, A and B
therefore had skin colours that were markedly different from their
parents, and different from each other, differences that as they grew
older, became more obvious.
The applicants brought claims for damages, saying that:
“The plaintiffs have been the subject of abusive and derogatory
comment  and  hurtful  name  calling  from  other  children,
causing emotional upset. Further, the plaintiffs have been the
subject  of  adverse  and hurtful  comments  from others,  both
71   High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions
      A (A Minor) & Ors. v A Health & Social Services Trust [2010] NIQB 108 (13 
October 2010)
      available at: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2010/108.html
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directed at them and overheard, about the colour of their skin,
the difference between the plaintiffs and about the difference
between the plaintiffs and their parents. This causes emotional
upset.  The  plaintiffs  have  questioned  their  parents  about
whether they were adopted. Should either of the plaintiffs go
on to have a child with a partner of mixed race any child born
to  them  is  likely  to  be  of  different  skin  colour  than  either
parent. The quality of the life of the plaintiffs and each of them
has  been  adversely  affected.  They  may  suffer  loss  and
damage.”
The first difficult question the court had to consider was whether or
not the defendant owed the claimants a duty of care at the time of the
mistake. The judge Gillen J considered that the common law position
with the right of the baby was settled by Burton v. Islington HA72, he
explained that there is a duty to take care not to cause damage to it
while still in its mother’s womb, and a child is deemed to possess at
birth of all the rights of action which it would have had if it  had
possessed legal personality at the date of any accident befalling its
mother.  Another point was the duty of care owed to human cells, this
would have had much wider ethical and legal implications than IVF
treatments if it had been considered. Once again we see that English
law does not protect the gametes or embryo, but only the baby once
it has been born has its own rights. The judges’ words to deny the
protection of the applicants were that:
“It seems to me that it is for Parliament to grasp the nettle of
whether  there  ought  to  be  a  duty  of  care  owed  in  the
circumstances postulated in this case. For my own part, sitting
72  ENGLAND AND WALES COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
   Burton v Islington Health Authority [1992] EWCA Civ 2 (18 March 1992)
   Available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1992/2.html
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as  a  judge  at  first  instance,  I  do  not  believe  that  it  is
appropriate for a judge to stretch the common law principle
inherent in Burton to embrace human cells as conferring the
relevant  status  for  a  duty  of  care  to  be  owed.  It  is  for
Parliament, after the appropriate social, moral, medical and
ethical  arguments  have  been  aired,  to  define  the  limits  of
protection which should be accorded in such circumstances. It
would  be  inapposite  for  this  court  to  usurp  that  function.
Absent the imprimatur of Parliament I am not content to find
that these plaintiffs have sufficient status to be owed a duty of
care.”
The  second  question  to  face  for  the  court  was  that  of  “loss  and
damage”.  Here the essential  issue was the skin colour  of  the two
young  children  because  they  were  both  perfectly  healthy.  This
incident did not cause them any physical health problems. Gillen J
considered the skin colour a normal character of a person, saying:
“In a modern civilised society the colour of their skin – no
more  than  the  colour  of  their  eyes  or  their  hair  or  their
intelligence or their height – cannot and should not count as
connoting some damage to them”
To support that a different skin colour is an injury would be contrary
to  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  contemporary and multi-ethnic
society, as well as a negative consequence for the self-esteem of the
brothers. The presence of persons sufficiently cruel as to issue racist
comments directed at these children is no basis for a conclusion that
they are somehow damaged by the clinic.
The conclusion was that the claimants have not suffered any legally
recognisable "loss or damage" connected to the mistake caused by
the defendant, so he had no civil obligations towards them.
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The solution ruled by the English court, however, may not have come
to the same conclusion if  the human rights of the child had been
taken into consideration in this case.73
3. SURROGACY
Surrogacy allows couples, a single man or a single woman who are
unable to conceive or carry a child themselves another possibility. As
in the case of heterologous fertilisation, surrogacy involves a third
person, a woman, not as a donor but as the carrier of the child. As of
2010 same sex couples can also legally use surrogacy as a means to
have a baby.74
In surrogacy, another woman remains pregnant for a person or couple
who want a baby. When the child is born, the woman carrier gives
the child to them.
There  are  two  types  of  surrogacy:  “traditional or straight”  and
“host”75.
The simplest form of surrogacy is known as “traditional surrogacy”.
This can be done in private without the assistance of a clinic. In this
case the sperm is from the intended father and ova from the surrogate
mother.  The  mother  can  fall  pregnant  in  the  traditional  way  or
through sperm injection, the self administered technique.
“Host surrogacy” is another alternative which is more expensive and
invasive for the surrogate mother. It can only take place in a fertility
clinic because the gametes implanted in the carrier mother are not her
73   P. Passaglia con contributi di E. Bottini, C. Guerrero Picó, S. Pasetto e M. T. 
Rörig., La Fecondazione Eterologa. Available at: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/CC_SS_fecond
azione_eterologa_201406.pdf
74   The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 enables same sex couples 
to apply for a parental order. This part of the Act will come into apply in April 
2010.
75    http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-options-surrogacy.html#3
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own.  The procedure  to  obtain  a  “host”  surrogate  pregnancy takes
longer  and more  medical  care  is  required,  when compared to  the
“straight” surrogacy method.
Once the interested parties find a surrogate mother, she must come to
the clinic with the applicants in order to start the procedure. It is not
the  clinic's  responsibility  to  procure  a  surrogate  for  the  intending
parents. There are websites and organisations  that can be helpful in
finding a surrogate, some are more secure such as the UK no-profit
surrogacy organisation76 and  others,  less  secure  such as  surrogacy
websites.
The clinic begins the process by regulating the surrogate's hormones
with fertility drugs and submitting her to vaginal and health controls
to confirm that she is the right candidate.
Once these tests are completed and the clinic is satisfied with the
results, it starts the procedure to prepare the ova and sperm for the
fertilization.
There are three ways to do the implantation procedure: by using the
eggs and sperm of the intended parents; from a donated egg fertilised
with the sperm of the intended father; or by an embryo which has
been created with donors' eggs and sperm. When both mother and
embryos are ready, up to two embryos are implanted in the uterus of
the surrogate mother. If any other embryos are remaining, they are
frozen for possible later use. Ten-fourteen days after the pregnancy
may be confirmed if successful.
If  the  procedure  is  unsuccessful,  the  surrogate  is  advised  to  stop
taking all medication, but if the intended parents wish to, a new IVF
cycle can start.
3.1 EVOLUTION OF REGULATION
76  http://www.surrogacyuk.org
50
Before  the  Warnock Committee  and to  date,  a  limited  number  of
regulations  have  been  issued  on  surrogacy.  This  practice  is  not
specifically regulated by UK law, however it is tolerated and some
rules have been issued to protect the surrogate mother and any child
that may be born from this procedure.
The  UK  Parliament  began  to  look  at  the  issue  of  surrogacy  in
particular after the 1985  “Baby Cotton Case”.  In this situation an
American couple found a surrogate mother in England through an
agency and she  was  inseminated  by the  sperm from the  intended
couple's husband. The agreement was that once the child was born,
the  surrogate  mother  would  give  the  new  baby  to  the  American
couple.  A problem  occurred  however,  when  the  couple  went  to
England to take the baby home with them. The local authority was in
doubt as to whether they could legally grant expatriation of the baby
and subsequently requested a court ruling to clarify the situation.
The court ruled that in the best interests of the child, the American
couple would take him back to the USA with them. The decision was
based on the fact that when a child is born through surrogacy and the
surrogate mother does not want the child, the commissioning parents
are allowed to take care of  the  child,  if  they can  offer  a  suitable
home.
The  judge  also  explained  his  concerns  regarding  the  commercial
aspect of this case, in which a woman had received money for giving
birth.  He  did  not  however,  argue  this  particular  detail  of  the
arrangement in the sentence delivered but noted that this practice of
exchange  of  money  is  completely  different  from  the  law  which
governs adoption, where no financial gains are permitted.77
Section 57 of the Adoption Act of 1976 stipulates that:
77   Shirley R. Jones and Rosemary Jenkins, The Law and the Midwife, UK, John 
Wiley & Sons, 15 April 2008 second edition, at145
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it  shall  not  be  lawful  to  make  or  give  to  any  person  any
payment or reward for or in consideration of—
(a) the adoption by that person of a child;
(b)  the  grant  by  that  person  of  any  agreement  or  consent
required in connection with the adoption of a child;
(c) the [F107handing over of a child by that person] with a view
to the adoption of the child; or
(d)  the  making  by  that  person  of  any  arrangements  for  the
adoption of a child.
However  under  section  57(3),  it  should  be  noted  that  a  judge  is
granted the power to authorise payments where appropriate.
In 1987 the same judge that presided over the “Baby Cotton case”
Mr Justice Latey, ruled in another surrogacy hearing in which he did
grant payment. In this instance a couple had agreed to pay a woman
£10.000 to carry and give birth to a baby conceived by the surrogate
mother.  The  surrogate  became  pregnant  through  a  normal  sexual
relationship with the husband of the committed couple.
The case was Re an Adoption Application ((Surrogacy) [1987] Fam
81)78.
The arrangement “was fully honored on both sides”.
The  judge  was  called  on  to  rule  if  the  payment  to  the  surrogate
mother was unlawful due to a violation of the Adoption Act. He ruled
that  the  payment  could  be  considered  as  compensation  for  the
inconvenience and expenses incurred by the surrogate mother during
the pregnancy. It was not to be considered as a previous payment for
the future baby's adoption.
78   Surrogacy. Review for health ministers of current arrangements for payments 
and regulation. Report of the review team.
      Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.
uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/
dh_4014373.pdf
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 In conclusion, without having any detailed regulation by Parliament
as to what exactly constitutes an expense, the “expenses” incurred
during a surrogate pregnancy can become an almost  limitless list,
difficult for any court to prove and define.
The first law which was enacted to avoid the creation of a market of
“wombs for rent” was the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, five
years before the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990.
The Surrogacy Arrangement Act gives the definitions of a surrogate
mother, surrogate arrangement and other connected terms. Ultimately
the Act  attempts  to  control  the aspect  of the commercial  trade of
these activities. Surrogacy is considered to be an act of the body, any
type of business or control of it is considered to be an offence, and
punishable as such by Law. Only arrangements “on a  commercial
basis”79 are  covered  by  this  Act.  Any  other  issues  in  surrogacy
arrangements were not taken into consideration until Section 36 of
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 was issued.
This was an amendment of the Surrogacy Arrangement Act of 1985:
“No surrogacy arrangement is enforceable by or against any of
the persons making it.”
This lack of enforceable surrogacy laws regards both the surrogate
mother  and the intended parents.  It  is  not possible  for  any of  the
parties  who have entered  into  a  surrogacy contract  to  sue  forcing
adherence to the agreement. The woman who gives birth is always
treated as the mother under UK law. She has the right to keep the
child  and be  the  effective  mother  of  the  baby,  even if  she is  not
79  Section 2(3) of the Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985 says that:
     «For the purposes of this section, a person does an act on commercial basis if: 
a) any payment is at any time received by himself or another in respect  of, or 
b) he does it with a view to any payment being received by himself or another 
in respect of making, negotiating or facilitating the making of, any surrogacy 
agreement. In this subsection ‘payment’ does not include payment to or for the 
benefit of a surrogate mother or prospective surrogate mother»
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genetically related to the child. Thus the intended parent has no rights
over  the child.  The birth  is  registered with the surrogate mother's
name and if she is married, with her husband's name. If the surrogate
is not married a biological father can be immediately registered as
the legal father.
In other circumstances where the intended parents may not want the
child born from the surrogacy the agreement is not enforceable by
court and the surrogate mother cannot sue them. For this reason the
trust of both parties is of up most importance and essential in any
surrogacy arrangements in the UK. It is also one of the reasons that
pushed English people who want to use surrogacy treatments, to go
abroad to find surrogate mothers.80
An  important  rule  was  introduced  in  the  1985  Act  to  avoid  the
marketing of wombs and women in particular. This rule punishable
by law was brought in against commercial intermediaries, persons or
agencies that agree to a woman's performance and surrogacy. This
Act  penalized  any  form  of  direct  advertising  to  promote  the
conclusion of such agreements.81
80   In other countries, such as India, the surrogacy arrangement has a legal value 
that ensure both parties. An interview from The BBC Megazine explains well 
the reasons of many people who ask abroad the surrogacy:
     “Bobby and Nikki Bains, a Sikh couple who live in Essex, went there after 
finding out Nikki could not have children. They wanted an Asian egg donor and
an Asian surrogate, and it was hard to find either in the UK.
      In India you need a legally binding contract before you start the surrogacy 
process. Surrogates can only be "womb carriers" - they cannot be genetically 
related to the baby.
     "If the baby is disabled or even if you become disabled, who's going to be the 
next of kin, who's going to look after baby? All that is pointed out in the 
surrogacy contract," says Bobby.
      He defends payments to surrogates, who are limited to carrying other people's 
babies twice.
     "These surrogates in India or the ladies that want to do surrogacy know what 
they're getting themselves into. I think most people go to do a job. Most people 
go to work because they need the money."
      From: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28864973
81    Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985, Section 2:
       Negotiating surrogacy arrangements on a commercial basis, etc.
      (1)No person shall on a commercial basis do any of the following acts in the 
United Kingdom, that is—
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This provision however did allow for no-profit organisations, which
puts surrogate mothers in contact with people who want to have a
baby through surrogacy.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 in Part 3, Section
59,  also  states  today  that  these  no-profit  organisations  can  ask
reasonable rates to pay for the cost of their activities.
Before the drawing up of the 2008 Act, a commission was set up in
1997  by  the  United  Kingdom  Health  Ministry,  the  Brazier
Commission  named  after  the  chairwoman,  Margaret  Brazier.  The
purpose of this commission was to review the controversial themes
of surrogacy. The committee focused their attention on: the payment
of  surrogate  mothers;  whether  an  agency  could  regulate  the
surrogacy arrangement and if the existing regulations needed to be
modified.
In the Report the review team reconstructed what has been the UK
Surrogacy  Experience  to  date  and  defined  the  problem  of  a
surrogate’s  payment.  They examined  this  issue  whilst  considering
that any payment made contravened the norm that no body part could
be sold or intimate services be paid for.
They found that these prohibitions to sell the body or the services of
such  appear  to  be  ignored  when  surrogacy  agreements  are  made
between  the  parties  concerned.  When  a  commissioning  couple
     (a)initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making of a 
surrogacy arrangement,
     (b)offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or
     (c)compile any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the 
making of, surrogacy arrangements;
      and no person shall in the United Kingdom knowingly cause another to do any 
of those acts on a commercial basis.
     (2)A person who contravenes subsection (1) above is guilty of an offence; but it 
is not a contravention of that subsection—
     (a)for a woman, with a view to becoming a surrogate mother herself, to do any 
act mentioned in that subsection or to cause such an act to be done, or
     (b)for any person, with a view to a surrogate mother carrying a child for him, to 
do such an act or to cause such an act to be done.
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applies  for  a  parental  order  or  adoption  however  these  payments
come into question. They concluded that surrogates had been paid a
fee which was over and above the “expenses” of their pregnancy. As
a  solution  the  Committee  listed  the  hypothetical  expenses  which
could be incurred during the pregnancy82
The  second  point  reviewed  by  the  committee  was  regarding  the
involvement of agencies in surrogacy arrangements. They proposed
that the Health Department should monitor these no-profit agencies.
The committee gave three suggestions for how surrogacy agreements
could be regulated: Extend the Role of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology  Authority  (HFEA);  the  establishment  of  a  licensing
authority specifically for the oversight and control of surrogacy; the
registration of all agencies in a UK Health Department register to
ensure all operations respect a Code of Practice.
These  solutions  proposed  by the  Brazier  Committee  required  the
creation of a new Surrogacy Act however, the recommendations of
the Brazier Report were never put into practice and included in The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008. Once again all the
issues surrounding surrogacy had not been properly regulated.  
Only few aspects of surrogacy were taken into account in the 2008
Act,  such  as  the  legal  provision  that  no-profit  agencies  can  have
expenses refunded for their activities. An amendment was passed on
6 April  2010 which allowed unmarried and same sex couples  the
possibility to make an application for a parental order. This new rule
was  retrospective  for  the  first  six  months,  which  meant  that  gay
couples  who  were  already  carrying  a  child  conceived  through
82    Maternity clothing; Counselling fees; Healthy food; Legal fees; Domestic 
help; Life and disability insurance; Travel to form hospital/clinic; Medical 
expenses; Telephone and hospital expenses; Ovulation and pregnancy tests; 
Overnight accommodation; Insemination and IVF costs; Child care to attend 
hospital/clinic; Medicines and vitamins.
      If the surrogate mother is employed when she enters into the surrogacy 
arrangement and has to take time off work in connection with the pregnancy or 
birth, her actual loss of earning should be reimbursed. The time taken off work 
should be in accordance with medical advice and statutory guidelines.
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surrogacy before that date had until 5 October 2010 to apply for a
parental order.83
For payment of the surrogate mother the law excludes that a woman
can be paid for surrogacy but she must have a reasonable payment
for expenses occurred during her gestation period. Every situation is
different and how much is needed must be discussed in detail before
finalising a surrogacy arrangement. The law does not give a precise
value as to how much a surrogate can receive for these gestational
costs, although this provision would be well received. The payments
to surrogates are currently around £12.000/£15.00084.
3.2 PARENTHOOD OF CHILDREN BORN
FROM SURROGACY
Surrogacy as already shown is a complex subject and the law has
substantial  oversights.  For  these  reasons  the  same HFE Authority
recommends getting legal advice before any party makes a decision
regarding surrogacy treatments.
The biggest problem is regarding motherhood and fatherhood of the
child born from surrogacy.
In  the  UK  the  fundamental  legal  aspect  of  motherhood  is  the
gestational relationship between the mother and the foetus. This is
what  was  established  by  the  Heterologous  Fertilisation  Rules.
Problems occur  because the  surrogate mother  has  the  natural  link
with the baby yet the purpose of surrogacy is to find another womb
for those who cannot carry a child themselves. The UK laws do not
83    Human Fertilisation and Embryology (parental orders) Regulations 2010
      http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/985/made
84   Emily Jackson , Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, at 861
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take into account the fact that the carrier is the “third person” and
should not be the one who keeps the child after the birth.
The surrogate, as the woman giving birth, will be the legal mother of
the child and will be nominated as such on the birth certificate. She
will  have  the  parental  responsibilities  until  the  intended  parent
applies through the courts for a parental order or adoption85.
If the surrogate mother is married or in a civil relationship at the time
of the treatment,  her partner will be the second legal parent of the
child born, unless it can be shown that the mother's partner did not
consent to the surrogacy. This situation is slightly different when the
surrogate is single or her partner does not consent to treatment or
they are separate. The intended parent, who at the same time is the
biological father of the child, would be automatically recognized as
the legal parent under common law.
From 1 October 2013, the HFE Authority changed its Guidelines and
created a new consent form on legal parenthood. This opened the
way  for  intended  parents  involved  in  surrogacy  arrangements
enabling  one  of  them  to  automatically  become  one  of  the  legal
parents of the baby at birth:
As of 1 October 2013, it will be possible for one of the intended
parents  commissioning  a  surrogacy  arrangement  to  be
recognized as  the  legal  parent  when the  child  is  born,  if  the
surrogate  is  not  married  or  in  a  civil  partnership  and  the
relevant consents are in place.86
85    Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008; Section 33:
      Meaning of “mother”
86   Guidance; Surrogacy and legal parenthood – changes from 1 October 2013 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/7962.html
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Therefore just by completing the new consent form, any person can
be  the  parent  of  a  surrogate  child  without  being  in  a  biological
relationship with the baby.
3.3 THE PARENTAL ORDER
The intended parent who is to become the legal parent of the baby
born from the surrogate mother has two possibilities: to ask a court
for the parental order which has procedural requirements to respect
to  have  it  issued,  or  to  apply  for  adoption  if  the  parental  order
prerequisites cannot be met.
The intended parents (both or just one, if the other already has legal
parenthood) can apply to the court within six months of the birth of
the baby for a parental order, as provided under Section 54 of the
Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  of  2008.  This  order
transfers the legal rights from the surrogate and legal mother to the
committed parents. The applicants must make the order in a Family
Proceeding Court by depositing the specific form. The court then sets
a date for the hearing87.
Section 54 of the 2008 Act contains the conditions that must be met
in order to request a parental order:
(1)On an application made by two people (“the applicants”),
the court may make an order providing for a child to be treated
in law as the child of the applicants if—
(a)the child has been carried by a woman who is not one of the 
applicants, as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or 
sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination,
87    https://www.gov.uk/become-a-childs-legal-parent
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(b)the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to 
bring about the creation of the embryo, and
(c)the conditions in subsections (2) to (8) are satisfied.
(2)The applicants must be—
(a)husband and wife,
(b)civil partners of each other, or
(c)two persons who are living as partners in an enduring 
family relationship and are not within prohibited degrees of 
relationship in relation to each other.
(3)Except in a case falling within subsection (11), the 
applicants must apply for the order during the period of 6 
months beginning with the day on which the child is born.
(4)At the time of the application and the making of the order—
(a)the child's home must be with the applicants, and
(b)either or both of the applicants must be domiciled in the 
United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.
(5)At the time of the making of the order both the applicants 
must have attained the age of 18
The court  must  be  sure  that  no  money,  excluding any reasonable
expenses  incurred,  has  been  paid  to  the  surrogate  mother  unless
otherwise authorized by the court. The most recent case law is quite
clear that the court authorises payments retrospectively, if they are
not  too  disproportionate  in  relation  to  the  reasonable  expenses
incurred.
To obtain that order it is also necessary to have the consent of the
surrogate mother.  Legal  parenthood can only be  transferred if  the
mother and the second parent agree to it.
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The welfare  of  a  child  is  of  paramount  concern  to  a  court  when
granting a parental order. Its deliberations are based on the welfare
criteria  from  the  Children  Act  2002.88If  the  order  is  granted  it
conditions not only the period of childhood, but the child’s whole
life. For this reason the court has an officer of “CAFCASS”89 prepare
a report.  The officer must visit the family at home and talk to both
intended parents. This meeting is presented in a report to the court,
explaining if the conditions set out above have been met. The court
must make its decision holding in consideration the best interests of
the  child.  The  release  of  a  parental  order  changes  the  legal
parenthood and parental responsibilities of the children. A new birth
certificate is issued including the new parenthood and excluding the
old ones, because in the UK only two parents can be recognized by
law.
Any child born through a surrogacy arrangement, as with other IVF
treatments, has the right to know about their origins. For this reason
rule 13.16 of the Family Procedure Rule 2010 provides for disclosure
of information to any child born from these practices at the age of
eighteen.
Through  application  to  the  court,  a  child  can  have  access  to  the
following information:
(a)the  application  form  for  a  parental  order  (but  not  the
documents attached to that form);
(b)the  parental  order  and  any  other  orders  relating  to  the
parental order proceedings;
(c)a transcript of the court’s decision; and
88   Welfare Checklist, Section 1, Adoption and Children Act 2002  as applied by 
the 2010 Regulations
89   The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) looks
after the interests of children involved in family proceedings.
      http://www.cafcass.gov.uk/
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(d)a report made to the court by the parental order reporter.90
3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The  English  law's  position  on  surrogacy  is  different  from  some
European  countries,  as  Italy  or  Germany,  which  take  a  more
restrictive approach, and other countries, such as US or India, that
make this treatment much more accessible.
Some interested parents, who live in more restrictive countries, go to
the UK as  they are attracted by the possibility of easier access to
surrogacy.  At  the  same  time  some  British  couples  looking  for  a
surrogate  mother  drive  abroad  to  a  country  with  more  liberal
jurisdiction  where  they  find  commercial  surrogacy  is  permitted,
arrangements  are  legally  enforceable  and  surrogates  are  freely
available.
In consideration of this phenomenon the HFE Authority warns users
of the issues and risks associated in doing the surrogacy abroad. In
2008  a  paper  on  “Cross  border  fertility  treatment”91 published
information about surrogacy outside the UK. This paper explains the
issue and the services offered to the foreign commissioning, using a
selection of sample Fertility Clinics in the world.
From a legal point of view, what are the implications of this trade of
surrogacy?
Let's begin by observing the phenomenon of foreign couples coming
to the UK for treatment. The difficulty of finding a surrogate mother
is something not to be underestimated also due to the scarce legal
90    http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2955/article/13.16/made
91   http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/AM_Item3_Dec08.pdf
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value  of  arrangements  between  the  parties.  The  foreign  intended
parents must find a woman they can trust and vice versa because, as
already stated, the position of the surrogate mother is not protected
by law after the birth of the baby.
Other difficulties, once they find the surrogate and after the birth of
the  child,  are  requirements  that  must  be  respected  for  issue  the
parental  order.  The 2008 Act  requires  that  “either  or  both  of  the
applicants  must  be  domiciled  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  in  the
Channel  Islands  or  the  Isle  of  Man”,  which  means  that  if  a
commissioning couple does not satisfy the domicile requirement, a
parental order will not be available.
This  is  happened in  2007,  in  the case  Re G (Surrogacy:  Foreign
Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam)92.
Judge McFarlane had to decide the parentage and future upbringing
of  a  child  born  out  of  a  non-commercial  surrogacy  arrangement
where the commissioning parents were domiciled in Turkey.
The  married  couple, Mr and Mrs G,  is  Turkish  nationals  and
domiciled in Turkey. They traveled to the UK and conceived a baby
girl M with a British surrogate mother, born on 29 September 2006.
According  to  the  rules  in  the  parental  order  application  form the
intended parents could not apply due to  their  nationality.  For  this
reason the case was taken to the High Court.
Unfortunately, the agency which they had used, a British surrogacy
agency named COTS (Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy),
had said to them that they could apply for the order. In the past, other
foreign couples had successfully obtained the order, unbeknown to
them however that it was not legal. In this case the Judge denied the
concession of a parental order to Mr and Mrs G.
92   Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) available at: 
http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed984
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After nine months of litigation, the case was resolved in favor of the
commissioning parents:
 
The aim of the court has therefore been to identify and establish
the most effective legal structure, short of a parental order, that
can facilitate Mr and Mrs G in due course adopting M in their
home country.
In the event this was achieved by making an order under ACA
2002, s 84
…
By ACA 2002, s 84(2) the High Court may, on an application
by persons who the court is  satisfied intend to adopt a child
under  the  law  of  a  country  or  territory  outside  the  British
Islands,  make  an order  giving parental  responsibility  for  the
child to them.
In  his  conclusion  Mr Justice  McFarlane  warned  that  English  law
should  not  be  used  by  foreign  couples  seeking  to  evade  more
restrictive home legislation. He advised any future applicants of the
need for strict observation of UK law regarding parental orders.
The situation is not any easier for British couples who go abroad for
surrogacy.
In some countries the enforceable agreement allows the committed
parents  to  be  named  on  the  foreign  birth  certificate.  However
problems start when the couple, recognized as the legal parents in
another country, comes back to England calling for the recognition of
the same parentage. Here the court has to apply the UK law, the rules
regarding  the  parental  order,  the  Human  Fertilisation  and
Embryology Acts'  parenthood provisions and the prohibition of an
arrangement on a commercial basis.
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In the case of  Re K (Minors: Foreign Surrogacy)   [2010]  EWHC
1180 (Fam)93 the application was made even though the children had
not been granted entry clearance into the UK.
The case involved twins born in May 2009, as a result of a foreign
commercial surrogacy arrangement between the applicants resident
in  the  UK  and  a  married  couple  in  India.  At  the  time  of  the
application  the  children  were  in  India  at  the  home  of  the
grandparents. The UK applicants of Indian origins but resident in the
UK asked to a parental order to recognize them as the parents.
The children  were  conceived using  an egg from a  donor and the
sperm  of  the  man  of  the  committed  couple.  The  arrangement
recognized the British couple as the parents of the twins.
The case was adjourned with the possibility to proceed only if and
when the children were in the jurisdiction of the UK court.
The  UK Border  Agency has  now issued  guidance  known as
"Inter-Country  Surrogacy  and the  Immigration  Rules".  The
relevant part of the Guidance is paragraph 41 which reads as
follows:
"If either of the commissioning couple has a genetic connection
with the child, entry outside the Rules at the discretion of the
Secretary of State may be possible, but such entry clearance will
only be granted on condition that a section 30 parental order is
applied  for  within  6  months  of  birth  and  where  evidence
suggests that such an order is likely to be granted…"
93   Re K (Minors ) (Foreign Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 1180
      http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed66427
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The  genetic  relationship  was  established  and  the  application  was
made within the required time. Judge Hedley expressed considerable
unease in  drawing any conclusions  as to  the likely success of the
application, because the children were not resident in the UK. The
court had no jurisdiction over them. The law requires that the welfare
of the children must be taken into account by observing them with
the  applicant  parent  whilst  living  in  UK.  The  court  also  had  to
approve the payment for the arrangement.
Mr  Justice  Hedley  concluded  that,  the  court  could  not  take  into
account the request of the applicant:
“If and when the children are in the country (and only then) 
can the court proceed further with this application”
Another problem, rose in this case but not ruled on (but decided by
the same judge Hedley in the Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008]
EWHC 3030 (Fam)94),  was the commercial payment that had been
made to the surrogate mother. Section 54 of the 2008 Act explained
that the court has the power to authorize a payment in excess of the
costs incurred for the pregnancy. The difficulty for the court, when it
is  asked to  authorize  the  payments,  is  the  fact that  the  child  has
already been born and its welfare weighs against the public policy
imperative of prohibiting commercial payments. In the case of X & Y
the Judge expressed this  particular problem with payment and the
court's role in this proceeding:
94    X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam)
      In this case a British couple A couple had made a surrogacy arrangement with a
Ukranian woman who gave birth to twins using anonymously donated eggs 
fertilised by the male applicant’s sperm. Although the commissioning parents 
were treated as the legal parents in the Ukraine and named on their birth 
certificate, instead the English surrogacy law did not recognize their parental 
status and so did not allow them to confer British citizenship status on the 
children. http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed28706
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“I feel bound to observe that I find this process of authorization
most  uncomfortable.  What  the  court  is  required  to  do  is  to
balance  two  competing  and  potentially  irreconcilably
conflicting concepts. Parliament is clearly entitled to legislate
against commercial surrogacy and is clearly entitled to expect
that the courts should implement that policy consideration in
its decisions. Yet it is also recognized that as the full  rigour of
that policy consideration will bear on one wholly unequipped to
comprehend it let alone deal with its consequences (i.e. the child
concerned) that rigour must be mitigated by the application of a
consideration  of  that  child’s  welfare.  That  approach  is  both
humane and intellectually coherent.”
In the absence of a Parliamentary revisions the most recent courts
decisions have been based exclusively on the welfare of the child
rather  than  any monetary issues.  At  the  time of  application  for  a
parental  order  the  court  must  be  informed  of  any  commercial
agreement between the parties involved in the surrogacy, however
the child interest is of prime concern before any economical interests
that may arise.
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THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Reproductive technologies include techniques, like IVF, which help
infertile  people  achieve  pregnancy,  or  techniques  that  modify
embryos  for  scientific  purpose,  such  as  the  creation  of  chimeric-
embryos or the reproductive cloning.
ART appears  to  be  very accessible  in  the  United  States.  The US
media  exposure  on  this  subject  at  an  international  level  would
suggest a large amount of the legislation regulating these activities.
On the contrary, there is a not a great deal of regulation both at the
federal and at the state level on this subject. In the U.S. we would
rather talk about non-regulation.
Another  issue  that  must  be  taken into  account  is  the  presence  of
American Constitution, something that does not exist in England.
The silence of the federal and most state governments is supported
by a complete  lack of legal  relies. There is  a  lack of  a  unilateral
jurisdiction, and no system of precedents that demonstrate the right
way to follow in the absence of statutes.
From the 1970 until  the beginning of the new millennium several
blue-ribbon commissions95 were established in the United States to
analyze these subjects. However there was not the necessary political
95   Blue ribbon commission is a group of exceptional people appointed to 
investigate or study or analyze a given question, often appointed by a 
government body. It might be composed of independent scientific experts or 
academics with no direct government ties to study a particular issue or 
question, or it might be composed of citizens well known for their general 
intelligence and experience.
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support  to convert  their  findings into law96 and the work of these
commissions was never used.97
The technologies used for ART are in evolution and have a big area
of action. Therefore it is extremely difficult to establish laws which
regulate and are up to date with all the factors that are involved in
this field.
Neither  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  (1787)  nor  the
subsequent  amendments  contain  rules  regarding  the  practices  of
assisted  reproduction.  However  the  theme finds  its  legal  loophole
through constitutional interpretation.
The right of reproduction is protected by the U.S. Constitution under
the fifth and fourteenth amendment:
Right to privacy: personal autonomy
The  right  of  privacy  has  evolved  to  protect  the  freedom of
individuals to choose whether or not to perform certain acts or
subject  themselves  to  certain  experiences.  This  personal
autonomy has  grown into  a  'liberty'  protected by the  Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. However, this liberty
is narrowly defined and generally protects privacy of family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing. There
have  been  attempts  to  further  extend  the  right  of  privacy
under  the  1st,  4th,  and  5th  Amendments to  the  U.S.
Constitution; however, a general right to personal autonomy
has yet to take hold beyond limited circumstances.98
96   Margaret Foster Riley with Richard A. Merril
     The Columbia, 2005, Science and Technology Law Review, volume VI
      Regulating reproductive genetics: a review of American Bioethics commission 
and comparison to the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
at 4-5-6
      www.stlr.org
97    Id. at 60-63; the text search an explanation on the reasons why in the US there
aren't enacted legislation to regulate the ART
98  http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_autonomy
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As cited above the right to privacy has been expanded to include any
cases dealing with reproductive rights to be applied to the area of
assisted reproduction.
The right to privacy has evolved in two directions: the positive right
which involves the possibility for any person to be alone to make
their own decisions, and the negative prospective which is that they
can act without government interference.
However this right to privacy does not mean that the government has
the duty to offer assistance when a person acts on this Constitutional
right.
As is shown by the words of the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980):
“The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause...does not
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom.”99
Rights that can be translated, in reference to ART, such as the right of
a person to be free to decide on whether to use artificial insemination
and  other  reproduction  techniques.  On  the  contrary  there  is  no
obligation of the State to give people the means to have access to
these treatments.
99   http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/448/297/case.html#317
     Pp. 448 U.S. 317-318.
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1. THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETATION
The U.S. Supreme Court refers to the right to procreate as the right to
have or not have a baby. It is considered a fundamental right of every
person.
The ongoing of cases which use the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of  the  Constitutional  right  to  procreate  regarding  interruption  or
avoidance  of  pregnancy  by  contraceptives  use  and  the  right  to
terminate  a  gestation  prior  to  viability  for  any  reason,  or  after
viability in order to protect the woman’s life or health.100
The  use  of  assistive  reproduction  corresponds  to  the  right  to
procreation, not the right to avoid pregnancy. These judgments of the
Supreme Court promote the opposite right, to avoid gestation, so the
extension to ART requires a contrary interpretation.
There are precedents which however refer directly to the Right to
Procreate, or rather the limitation of that right.
The first date back to the 1927 was the  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927)101.
100 See: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) in which Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional a Connecticut Statute that prohibits "any drug, 
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." ;
      Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) in which the Court removed the 
unequal Massachusetts' Law which deny the right of the unmarried people to 
posses contaceptions;
      Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) in which the Supreme Court decided that the 
Texas statute which states criminal abortion is a violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
101 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/274/200/case.html
71
It was a case which followed the eugenic’s movement102, a doctrine
about the real possibility of improving the quality of the human race
using selective reproduction.
An Act of Virginia approved on 20 March 1924 (Laws 1924, c. 394),
stated that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be
promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives.103
Under  this  law,  Carrie  Elizabeth  Buck  the  plaintiff,  who  was
considered feeble minded, sued Bell, the superintendent of the State
Colony  for  Epileptics  and  Feeble  Minded,  following  an  order  to
perform an operation which would have make her daughter sterile
and her.
In 1923 she became pregnant as the result  of being raped, by the
nephew of her foster parents. That pregnancy was considered a sign
of her promiscuity and feeble-mindedness. In fact Carrie was a child
born out of wedlock, from Emma Buck, a woman considered to have
been a “low grade moron” and promiscuous.104
Applying the Virginia Act on September 1924, superintendent Priddy
(the superintendent before Bell) approved a list of sixteen candidates
for sterilization, one of whom was Carrie Buck.
The Act seemed to give every assurance of procedural due process.
In fact the superintendent was require to petition a special board of
his  hospital  and  to  file  an  affidavit  with  respect  to  the  facts  he
102  The study of or belief in the possibility of improving the qualities of the 
human species or a human population, especially by such means as 
discouraging reproduction by persons having genetic defects or presumed to 
have inheritable undesirable traits (negative eugenics) or encouraging 
reproduction by persons presumed to have inheritable desirable traits (positive 
eugenics)
103 In the course of the next generation, the Commonwealth of Virginia, which 
coercively sterilized more than eight thousand  persons, became the second 
leading state in the country in this procedure, surpassed only by the 
considerably more populous State of California. The Supreme Court Reborn: 
The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt at the end of six 
paragraph
104  http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Buck_v_Bell_1927#start_entry
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presented. The patient had the right to appeal to the County Court,
which would review the evidence before issuing the order.  Lastly
every party could sue in the Supreme Court of Appeals.
The  young  woman  (she  was  eighteen  at  that  time),  before  the
sterilization, started the trial against that order in the County Circuit
Court. The trial was brought in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1927.
The respondent here was Bell, the new superintendent of the State
Colony  for  Epileptics  and  Feeble  Minded,  named  after  Priddy's
death.  In  the  Court  the  Virginia  Act  was  claimed  by the  plaintiff
Carrie Buck as unconstitutional. She stated that it was a violation of
the due process clause of the XIV Amendment which deprived her of
her constitutional right of body integrity, and the right to decide to
procreate.
The Supreme Court  delivered an 8 to  1105 decision  upholding the
order to sterilize Carrie Buck and the law that authorized it.106 The
Court  did  not  find  any  violation  under  the  constitution  and  its
amendment.
Mr  Justice  Holmes  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  including
some controversial sentences:
“Experience has shown that heredity plays an important part
in the transmission of insanity,  imbecility, …We have seen
more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better  for  all  the  world,  if  instead  of  waiting  to  execute
105  Mr Justice Butler dissents.
106 William E. Leuchtenburg , The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional 
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt; One Mr Justice Holmes and Three 
Generation of Imbeciles, Oxford University Press, 06 April 1995, paragraph 
from 1 to 6
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degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their  kind…Three  generations  of  imbeciles
are enough.”
In reference to ART the lesson to be learn, from the  Buck v. Bell
underlined, is that the State have the power. It can decide when or
never  allow  people  to  procreate,  also  when  there  are  other
fundamental rights, such as in the Buck case, to protect the welfare of
the society over and above the individual right to procreate.107
Buck has  never  been  explicitly  overruled.  Today a  law  which
enforces people to be sterilised would be not conceivable.
Another  case  from the  40s,  which  reaffirmed the  principle  of  the
Buck case was Skinner v. Oklahoma. 108
The U.S.  Supreme Court  did  not  deny the  power  of  the  State  to
regulate  procreation,  but  in  doing so it  should have respected the
principle of equality before the law.
In  1935  the  Habitual  Criminal  Sterilization  Act  was  passed  in
Oklahoma. Under that Act any habitual criminal “who, having been
twice  convicted...of  crimes  amounting  of  felonies  involving  moral
turpitude,  is  thereafter  convicted...of  a  crime  involving  moral
turpitude”, would be subject to sterilization.
Mr Skinner, who has been convicted twice of armed robbery, and in
1926  of  the  crime  of  stealing  chickens,  was  considered  habitual
criminal and therefore under that Act had to be sterilized.109
107 There are rights and powers “not delegated to the United States,” and
      reserved to the states, under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
    “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor  
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the  
people.”
108 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
      https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/316/535/case.html
109 Susan Merril Squier, Poultry Science, Chicken Culture: a Partial 
Alphabet,Rutgers University Press, 2011, at 193
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He  challenged  the  Act  as  unconstitutional  by  reason  of  the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In front of the Supreme Court the Skinner case was decided for the
petitioner:  
“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic  civil  rights of  man.  Marriage  and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”
The State,  putting  a  limit  to  this  right,  for  public  welfare,  has  to
respect  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  and  the  Fourteenth
Amendment110.
The Oklahoma Act did not however place the same limitation on the
freedom  to  procreate,  for  all  similar  situations  were  treated  in
different ways. In the words of Justice William Douglas:
 “A  person  who  enters  a  chicken  coop  and  steals
chickens commits a felony (id., § 1719), and he may be
sterilized if  he is thrice convicted.  If,  however,  he is a
bailee of the property and fraudulently appropriates it,
he is an embezzler.  Id., § 1455. Hence, no matter how
habitual  his  proclivities  for  embezzlement  are,  and no
matter how often his conviction, he may not be sterilized.
Thus,  the  nature  of  the  two crimes  is  intrinsically  the
same, and they are punishable in the same manner.”
110 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369. "Nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
      These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality, and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of 
equal laws.
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The  Supreme  Court  ruling  in  the  Skinner  case did  not  say
anything different to the Buck case. If the statute of Oklahoma
had been written in a way where the fundamental rights were
respected, the eugenics' decision to sterilize Mr Skinner would
have taken place, as many years before with Miss Buck.
All these cases demonstrate that the Right to Procreate for the
Federal Supreme Court is the decision of each individual US
State.
Until  today  there  has  not  been  a  judgement  from the  U.S.
Supreme Court on assisted reproduction.
2. THE ONLY FEDERAL INTERVENTION:
FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATE
AND CERTIFICATION ACT
On December 1981 Elizabeth Carr, America’s first baby conceived
from IVF treatment, was born.111
After that birth there has been an increasing use of these treatments.
In  response  to  the  doubts  about  the  procedures  of  reproductive
technology and the certification of the laboratories, the US Congress
enacted  the  federal  legislation  Fertility  Clinic  Success  Rate  and
Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRC or Public Law 102-493)112.
This Act took effect two years after the date of its enactment. The
purpose  of  the  Act  is  to  make  clinics  performing  ART  provide
annually data for all procedures performed to the Secretary of Health
and Human Service,  through the Centers  for  Disease  Control  and
111 From Elizabeth Comeau story in The Boston Globe available at:
      http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2010/08/06/a_first_for_the_first/
112 The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act 1992
      PUBLIC LAW 102-493-OCT.24, 1992;   
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-Pg3146.pdf
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Prevention  (CDC).  The  other  objective  is  to  certify  embryo
laboratories. The model for the certification of the laboratories must
be provided by the interested States.
The CDC's website has the organisations listed which currently offer
non  federal  laboratory  accreditation  programs.  These  include:
College of American Pathologist/American Society for Reproductive
Medicine;  the  Joint  Commission  on  Accreditation  of  Healthcare
Organisation and the New York State Tissue Bank certification for
ART laboratories.113
In  1996,  the  CDC  began  data  collection  regarding  assisted
reproductive technology procedures performed in the United States,
as mandated by the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification
Act  and  published  its  first  report  in  1997.  Since  then,  CDC has
continued to  publish annual  surveillance report  (latest  is  the 2012
Report).114
The CDC 'ART Success Rates Report is divided into 5 Sections.
They provide information on the success of the treatments, indicated
by the data collected, and all the cycles of any type of treatments
performed  in  United  States  clinics.  The  data  also  includes
information about other factors which may be related to the patient or
are out  of the clinic’s control.  This information provides potential
ART users with an idea of the possible success of the procedure and
trends.
In order to have more precise reports the CDC cooperates with other
organisation  which  collect  data  from  the  US  clinics:  the  U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, the American Society for
Reproductive  Medicine  (ASRM)  and  the  Society  for  Assisted
Reproductive Technology (SART).115
113 http://www.cdc.gov/art/patientresources/using.html
114 http://www.cdc.gov/art/patientresources/using.html
115 Id.
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Another type of surveillance which is more complete and that gives
more  detailed  data  about  the  woman  and  children  from  ART,  is
undertaken with the collaboration of the Departments of Health of
Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts and Michigan.
This  project  started with the State  of  Massachusetts  in  2001,  and
after  was  extended  to  other  States,  is  named  States  Monitoring
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SMART) Collaborative.
The SMART data set is used for both research (to monitor the state
of heath of mothers and babies; to know the cause of death of the
children and the mother comparing the ART data with the data of
those  who  have  not  been  subjected  to  these  treatments)  and
surveillance.116
In addition to the FCSRCA the National Institute of Health has other
guides governing research in reproductive treatment.
2.1 OTHER FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Together  with the CDC other  federal  associations  have regulatory
responsibility  on  the  development  of  ART:  the  Food  and  Drug
Administration117 (FDA), and the Centre for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS).
The FDA is responsible for protecting public health by assuring the
safety and security of drugs, biological products and medical devices.
Everyone, who works in reproductive medicine, can only prescribe
medication approved by the FDA.
The  FDA  also  has  jurisdiction  over  screening  and  testing  of
reproductive tissue such as eggs, sperm and embryos implanted in
humans, and issues the requirements for eggs and sperm donation118.
116 http://www.cdc.gov/art/smart/index.html
117 http://www.fda.gov/default.htm
118 These regulations are insert in the Code of  Federal Regulation, Title 21, 
volume 8, sec. 1271.
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The activities of testing and research are ruled by the CMS.
The standards for all laboratories testing performed on humans in the
United  States,  excluding  clinical  trials  and  basic  research,  are
regulated by Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services under the
Clinical  Laboratory  Improvement  Act  and  its  Amendments
(CLIA)119.
This  Act  regulates  the  jobs  of  the  laboratories  involved  in
reproductive  medicine,  with  the  exclusion  of  those  that  perform
analysis for preimplantation genetic diagnosis. They are not subject
to  regulation  like  clinical  laboratories  under  CLIA,  but  are  under
FDA control120.
The  purpose  of  the  CLIA is  to  uphold  the  quality  of  laboratory
testing  by  establishing  standards  on  accuracy,  reliability  and
timeliness of test results independently of where they are performed.
In  the  end,  to  assist  medical  centers  to  perform  the  assisted
reproduction techniques, it is important to remember the role played
by the professional medical associations, in particular the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)121.
This society is not only present in America (in all of the 50 States),
but also in an international context. It is present in more than 100
countries and leads his activities in development and research with
the support of the National Institute of Health.
Since  1950  the  ASRM  has  been  publishing  a  medical  journal,
Fertility  and  Sterility122,  which  is  an  important  reference  for  the
119 102 Stat. 2903, Public Law 100-578
      http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE-102-Pg2903.pdf
120 Susannah Baruch, J.D., David Kaufman, Ph.D., and Kathy L. Hudson, Ph.D.; 
Genetic testing of embryos: practices and perspectives of US in vitro 
fertilization clinics; Genetics and Public Policy Center, Berman Institute of 
Bioethics of Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC; Fertility and Sterility
Vol. 89, No. 5, May 2008; at 1056.
121 https://www.asrm.org/?vs=1
122 http://www.fertstert.org/
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physicians  who  are  involved  in  reproductive  techniques  and  the
problems of human infertility. In that journal on 5 November 2008,
for the first time, the Guidelines of ASRM were published.
The Association has a Practice Committee that issues regular reports,
including  guidelines  on  minimal  standards  for  providing  ART,
informed consent and the numbers of embryos to be transferred in
IVF technique123, although these are not enforced by law.
In conclusion the US government decision is not to systematically
issue  all  the  fertility  treatments  but  has  passed  secondary  laws
regarding activities linked to assisted reproduction technologies, such
as laws regarding  the human cloning (the federal law “Prohibits the
Secretary from using any funds for the conduct or support of human
cloning.”124. There is no a law which bans human cloning completely,
however there are several laws at state level, most of all  banning
that125).
3. STATE REGULATIONS ABOUT
FERTILITY TREATMENTS AND
SURROGACY
In order to gain an understanding of the US situation it is necessary
to  look  at  individual  State  regulations  in  assisted  reproduction
techniques, in particular heterologous fertilisation and surrogacy.
As  already  noted,  each  State  can  regulate  fertility  procedures
however, they must be in compliance with Federal laws.
123 https://www.asrm.org/Guidelines/
124 H.R. 4808 (111
th
): Stem Cell Research Advancement Act of 2009
      https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4808#overview
125 http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/human-cloning-laws.aspx
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In  this  study  we  will  examine  the  two  States  of  California  and
Massachusetts,  even  though  after  extensive  research  very  little
legislation can be found to have been enacted in these two States, as
is true at the Federal level. Therefore this leaves US citizens more
freedom in their reproductive procedural choices.  In the absence of
clear State regulations we must observe the protocol used in fertility
centers to gain a clear understanding of the US situation.
ART legislation in the United States is therefore very different from
that of the UK.
3.1 HETEROLOGOUS FERTILISATION: A
COMPARISON OF TWO STATES
The Federal disciplines for sperm and egg donation are set out in
Soft Law references and in the Guidelines for gamete and embryo
donation of 2008 by ASRM.126  These requirements are not binding
for the clinics, but most of the medical centers in each State comply
with them.
These  ASRM  recommendations  underline  the  importance  of
psychological  counselling  for  those  who  decide  to  proceed  with
donor insemination.
The Guidelines for sperm donation indicate the best qualities a donor
should have, in particular they list:
 A donor should be in good health  and without  any known
genetic  abnormalities.  A complete  clinical  examination  is
required to confirm all medical information127
126 http://www.npg-
asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Gui
delines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/2008_Guidelines_for_gamete
%281%29.pdf
127 Id, 128
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 “The donor should be of legal age and, ideally, less than 40
years of age”128, after that age the risk of genetic diseases and
foetus malformation increases.  
 The ASRM also restricts donations based on the number of
possible  births  by  one  sperm  donor.  This  number  is
determined  by  the  population  of  the  geographical  area
concerned.  “It  has  been  suggested  that  in  a  population  of
800,000,  limiting  a  single  donor  to  no  more  than  25
births”.129
This  last  point  is  extremely  important  for  the  ASRM  to  avoid
incestuous relationships between children born from the same sperm
giver. A donor identity system, that allows easy and safe research for
possible blood relationships, already existed before the publication of
any Guidelines. This system provides a donor identity number and in
doing so allows for the safe and easy research of  potential  blood
relations.
The  Guidelines  also  ruled  on  oocyte  donation  which  involves
significant inconvenience, discomfort and risk for the donor, unlike
sperm  donation.  For  these  reasons  the  Guidelines  underline  the
importance  of  a  psychological  consultation  for  donors  and
appropriate age limits. The provisions for egg donors are:
 “Oocyte  donors  should  be  of  legal  age  and  preferably
between the ages of 21 and 34 years”, because donors under
21 years  of  age  do  not  have  the  psychological  stability to
make a decision to donate. The donation should be based on
128 Id, 129
129 Id, 130
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individual or altruistic reasons, and not on other interests such
as money.130
 Monetary compensation to donors are allowed, but not in an
amount  to  make  it  the  only  reason  to  push  the  donor  to
donate. “Monetary compensation of the donor should reflect
the  time,  inconvenience,  and  physical  and  emotional
demands  and  risks  associated  with  oocyte  donation  and
should be at a level that minimizes the possibility of undue
inducement of donors and the suggestion that payment is for
the oocytes themselves”.
Generally,  the guidance states that any donor must sign a form in
which  he/she  confirms  his/her  medical  and  genetic  history.  The
information about his/her person must be kept on record in the clinics
for at least ten years. Clinics must be immediately informed of any
changes in health or risk factor status. 
Clinics  can  choose  to  accept  known  donors  and/or  anonymous
donations,  what  is  important  is  the  agreement  of  all  parties
concerned.  It  is  important  to  note  that  both  kinds  of  donors  are
absolved  of  all  legal  responsibility  for  children  born  from  their
donation, unless otherwise specified by the parties.
Finally,  people  looking for  a  donor are  encouraged to  choose  the
characteristics  they  desire  him/her  to  have.  However,  if  an  error
occurs in the implantation of gametes the case cannot be taken to
court nor the responsible party sued for damages, excluding that this
does not injure the child.131
130 Id, 131
131 This consideration is doing, taking into account the case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Utah: David Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center
No.960204, 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah, 1998)
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3.1.1 CALIFORNIA
In fertility clinics in the State of California, reproductive medicine is
open to anyone who has infertility or other problems having a baby.
Those who are married, in a relationship or single can be admitted
for treatments. It is indifferent if they are heterosexual, homosexual
or  transgender.  These  procedures  are  decided  on  the  basis  of  the
necessity of the patient.132
3.1.1.1 GAMETE AND EMBRYO DONATION
Heterologous fertilisation means the use of one or both gametes from
donors. Gamete donation involves the provision of gametes by a man
or woman who is not intended to be the resulting child's legal parent.
The California banks of gametes follow guidelines suggested by the
ASRM, but some clinics establish their own rules and apply these in
their centers.
The Federal guidelines on a donor's age are followed by the majority
of  clinics.  As  a  matter  of  fact  due  to  the  high  number  of  sperm
donors,  the  age  range  for  a  giver  is  restricted  to  a  younger  age
group133.  There are often other requirements such as the need for a
college degree, university graduation or even height specifications.134
These exclude essential medical requirements.
132 You can see it in some clinics website such as:  
http://www.pacificfertilitycenter.com/treatment-care/lgbtq-care
133 See the  Sperm Bank, Inc. of  California. Here applicants must be between the 
ages of 18 and 28
      http://www.spermbankcalifornia.com/donate-sperm.html
134 For example see: California Criobank requirements are Enrolled in (or a 
degree from) a 4-year university height of 5'9" and Enrolled in (or a degree 
from) a 4-year university.
      The Sperm Bank of California asks a height of 5'7'' and have completed
or are pursuing a college degree
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The ASRM guidelines limitation on the number of births per donor
are not enforced by law and therefore not always respected.
Some sperm banks do however impose a more restrictive limit, such
as the Sperm Bank of California that has a limit of ten families per
donor.
The donor agencies for egg donations have age limit restrictions for
givers, approximately thirty years of age.
In  California  the  gametes  banks  support  and promote  the  idea  of
donor  payment.  They  specify  that  money  should  not  be  the
motivation  behind  a  donation,  however  this  aspect  is  always
advertised.135
The  profit  for  sperm  donors  can  vary  depending  on  the  agency,
getting from $65 to $100 (U.S.D.).
The  compensation  for  women  who  donate  amount  ranges  from
$5,000 to $10,000 (U.S.D.).136  In addition, if they agree to travel to
donate all related expenses are paid by the recipients. Of course a
prior agreement regarding payment must be reached by all parties.
Evidence of deviations from the ASRM guidelines can be found in
the newspapers, much higher prices are offered to “special donors”
with  particular  physical  or  intellectual  characteristics.  In  March
2000,  an  ad  appeared  in  «The  Daily  Californian»  (the  Campus
newspaper  for the University of California,  Berkeley)  which read,
“Special Egg Donor Needed” and listed preferred donor criteria. The
compensation  was  $80,000  for  a  selected  donor.  In  addition,  all
related expenses  were to  be paid.137 Although a database of  these
135
 For example the California Cryobank seems to transform the sperm donation 
in a job, saying “Be your own boss - Donate at your convenience up to 3 times 
a week ($125.00/donation)”; and also “Note that sperm donors are required to 
report their earnings for tax purposes”.
136
 ASRM states: “Although there is no consensus on the precise payment that 
oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of $5,000 or more require 
justification and sums above $10,000 go beyond what is appropriate.”
137
 Debora L. Spar. 2006, The Baby Business: How Money, Science and Politics 
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advertisements does not exist, ads promising hundreds of thousand of
dollars usually only appear in college newspapers.
A study, made by Aaron Levine138, of ads for egg donors, underlines
that the existence of an advertisement does not mean that the money
was actually exchanged.
The study reveals that:
The possibility exists that some advertisements offering high
compensation are not genuine offers, but rather a ploy to build
an agency’s list of potential donors using a “bait and switch”
tactic. This idea gains some credence from the lack of highly
compensated donors appearing in follow-up studies of oocyte
donors139. In at least a few cases, however, employees of donor
agencies  have  confirmed  that  sums  as  large  as  $35,000  or
$50,000  have  been  paid.  Even  if  compensation  of  $20,000,
$35,000, or $50,000 (all  levels seen in the sample of oocyte
donor recruitment advertisements reported here) represent the
fringes of  the “market” for oocyte donation and occur only
infrequently.
The prospective parents choose donors in the hope of providing their
offspring with certain inheritable traits. This is often an attempt to
design one's children, something many people find unsettling.
Those who oppose embryo selection and the selection of a  donor
with particular traits and the exchange of large sums of money for
Drive the Commerce of Conception, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
138
 Aaron D. Levine, “Self Regulation Compensation and the Ethical Recruitment 
of Oocyte Donors” ,Hastings Center Report40, no. 2 (2010): 25-36
139
 A.L. Kalfoglou and J. Gittelsohn, “A Qualitative Follow-Up Study of Women’s
Experiences with Oocyte Donation,” Human Reproduction15, no. 4 (2000): 
798-805; N.J. Kenney and M.L. McGowan, “Looking Back: Egg Donors’ 
Retrospective Evaluations of Their Motivations, Expectations, and Experiences 
during Their First Donation Cycle,” Fertility and Sterility 93, no. 2 (2010): 455 
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this  practice,  maintain  that  these  parents  could  have  the  wrong
parental attitude and this could be harmful to children.
Prospective parents should want to have a child to love and not focus
on the characteristics they desire in a baby. It is one thing to want a
healthy child and quite another to be willing to pay huge sums to get
a “super baby”. A parent is supposed to love his children just because
they are his children. It is also possible that the children may not be
born with these desired traits. What would happen if a parent spent a
lot of money but the child  does not meet their  expectations? And
what would be the impact on the relationship between parent and
child?
These choices to design a baby are perhaps even more relevant when
speaking of embryo donation.
This  type  of  donation  can  involve  two  types  of  procedures:  the
creation of an embryo using donated gametes or the donation by a
couple of surplus embryos, from a prior fertility treatment.
In both cases the donors must sign a consent form giving permission
to use their gametes or embryos. The ASRM guidance also explains
the importance of psychological support for this type of decision.
Under the Provision of the California Penal Code at Section 367g140
anyone  who  knowingly  uses  sperm,  ova,  or  embryos  in  assisted
reproduction  technology,  for  any  purpose  other  than  what  it  is
indicated by the donors in the consent form shall  be punished by
imprisonment (three, four, or five years) or by maximum fine of fifty
thousand dollars, or both.
Donors are not paid for the embryo donation but reimbursed by the
recipient  for  specific  expenses  related  to  the  donation.  These
expenses may include testing and screening (e.g.; obligatory blood
tests) as well as expenses incurred transferring the embryos to the
140
 Available at:
     http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-
01000&file=346-367g
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clinic  and  costs  for  thawing  the  embryo.  The  State  of  California
prohibits embryos from being acquired, sold or offered for sale.141
Usually the donated embryos undergo freezing for future research or
implantation  for  reproductive  purposes.  There  is  no  limit  for  the
maximum storage period of embryos. The cryopreservation payment
procedure  does  not  have  a  time  limit  either,  it  only  sets  price
schedules for short and long periods.
The Procedures for human embryo freezing were developed in 1984
and widespread use  began in  the  late  1980s.  This  means  that  the
longest time a human embryo has been stored is  25-30 years and
patients with embryos in storage for this long have not returned to
use  them.  Some patients  have  returned  after  10-12  years  and  the
embryos have been thawed successfully and healthy babies born.
A formal written request from both parties is required to destroy the
frozen embryos.  When the clinic receives the request,  it  gives the
applicants some time for reflection. At the conclusion of this period
the embryos are then thawed and discarded.142 If payment of storage
is not met, or one of the donors dies the same solution is applied.143
The California Health and Safety Codes at Section 125315144 require
that  healthcare  providers  give  infertility  patients  the  necessary
information to make informed choices regarding availability of their
141
 Senate Bill No. 1260 CHAPTER 483;
      SB1260, Ortiz. Reproductive health and research. Available at: 
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/services/boards/HSCR/Documents/MO-SB1260-08-
2007.pdf
142
 The Pacific Fertility Center have a period of waiting before destroy the 
embryos of 30 days;
143
 See for example Sperm Bank, Inc dba Fertility Center of California 
www.spermbankcalifornia.com 6699 Alvarado Rd #220812791 Newport Ave., 
#206 San Diego, Ca. 92120  Tustin, Ca. 92780 Tel:619-265-0102 Fax:619-265-
1429 Tel:714-730-3060 Fax:714-730-3063Reproductive Material Cryostorage 
Agreement
144
 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=hsc&group=125001-
126000&file=125300-125320
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frozen embryos. The patients also have the right to set out directives
for the disposition of frozen embryos.
CPC  Section  6407145 of  California  law  recognizes  the  rights  of
posthumously conceived children to inherit.  This law states that a
child  conceived  with  a  deceased  person  prior  to  their  death,  is
entitled  to  inherit. The  application  of  this  provision  to  embryos
resulting  from  fertility  treatment,  is  detailed  under  CPC  Section
249.5146. The Code states when a child is conceived after the death of
a  decedent,  it  may  be  deemed  to  have  been  born  during  the
decedent’s lifetime and after the execution of all of the decedent's
testamentary materials. Written evidence must exist confirming the
decedent's willingness to provide his or her genetic material for the
posthumous conception of a child. The rule provides that gametes
may only be used for a two year time period after death.
3.1.1.2 MULTIPLE BIRTH PREGNANCIES
On 26 January 2009, in Bellflower, California, Nadya Suleman made
history  by  giving  birth  to  the  first  surviving  octuplets.147 Doctor
Michael  Kamrava,  who performed all  of  Nadya’s  IVF treatments,
had implanted her with twelve embryos at once, as per her request.
The number was well above the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine’s recommendation148.
145
 Available at: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?
section=prob&group=06001-07000&file=6400-6414
146
 Available at: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?
section=prob&group=00001-01000&file=248-249.8
147
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7852623.stm.
148
 Citing ASRM “Guidelines on number of embryos transferred”, 2004.
     “For patients under the age of 35 who have a more favorable prognosis,     
consideration should be given to transferring only a single embryo . No more   
than two embryos (cleavage stage or blastocyst) should be transferred.”
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The case was very controversial because the woman was 33 years
old, unemployed and single. She already had six children conceived
with  IVF  with  the  same  fertility  doctor,  including  twins  and  an
autistic son.149
Doctor  Kamrava  was  subject  to  an  investigation  by  the  Medical
Board of California for “a violation of the standard of care” due to
his decisions concerning his patient Nadya.
He was expelled and his medical license was revoke for five years
from  1  July  2011.  The  Medical  Board  founded  its  decision  on
repeated negligent acts by the physician on three documented patient
cases.150
The  Octuplet  birth  “drama”  brought  ART  and  the  problem  of
multiple birth pregnancies to national attention once again. Multiple
birth pregnancies can create serious medical and psychological risks
to both the mother and children conceived using IVF. The subject
was examined by all States, but no new laws to decrease multiple
pregnancies were adopted by any State, including California.151
Guidelines for the number of embryos to be transferred in in-vitro
fertilization cycles  were published in  Fertility and Sterility by the
Practice  Committee  of  the  ASRM  in  cooperation  with  SART
Committee.152
       Available at: http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282%2809%2903625-
5/fulltext
149
 http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_13675.asp
150
 Decision of the Medical Board of California on Michael Kamrava 's medical 
license (June 1, 2011), Agency case No. 06-2009-197098.
      Available at: http://documents.latimes.com/michael-kamrava-disciplinary-
decision/
151
 In Georgia the State Senate propose a bill entitled the “Ethical Treatment of 
Human Embryos Act”, but this was never turn into law.
      A bill proposal was made in Missouri, to enforce fertility clinics to respect the 
limit established by ASRM in embryo implantation. That bill was not voted by 
the State government.
152
 Fertility and Sterility Vol. 99, No. 1, January 2013 0015-0282, 2013 American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine, Published by Elsevier Inc.
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The  ASRM gives  specific  criteria  about  the  numbers  of  embryos
which can be implanted in a woman, based on her age:
A)  Patients under the age of 35 who have a favorable
prognosis should be offered a single-embryo transfer and no
more than two embryos (cleavage stage or blastocyst) should
be transferred. If two embryos are transferred, the patient(s)
must be counseled regarding the risks of multifetal pregnancy
and  the  counseling  should  be  documented  in  the  patient's
permanent medical record.
B) For patients  between 35 and 37 years  of  age  who
have a favorable prognosis, no more than two cleavage- stage
embryos should be transferred. All others in this age group
should  have  no  more  than  three  cleavage-stage  embryos
transferred.  If  extended culture  is  performed,  no more than
two blastocysts should be transferred to women in this age
group.
C) For patients  between 38 and 40 years  of  age  who
have a favorable prognosis, no more than three cleavage- stage
embryos or two blastocysts should be transferred. All others in
this age group should have no more than four cleavage-stage
embryos or three blastocysts transferred
D) For patients 41 42 years of age, no more than five
cleavage-stage  embryos  or  three  blastocysts  should  be
transferred
It  also  recommends  that  physicians  consider  a  patient’s  previous
success with IVF, the quality of the embryos to be transferred, and
whether the excess embryos are eligible for cryopreservation.
      Available at: 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Pr
actice_Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_numbe
r_of_embryos%281%29.pdf
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In CDC National Vital Statistic report 2013153, published in January
2015, we can find a decrease in multiple births (in reference to births
of three children from the same mother) in recent years. This could
be as a result of the new ASRM instructions.
The CDC data shows that, with the growth in use of ART, in the 80's,
the numbers of multiple births have increased by 400%, however this
has had a downward trend in recent years.
The Statutes of Business and Professions Code Business Sections,
2505 - 2521154 is the only Code in the State of California, which has
specific  references  to  multiple  births.  It  requires  midwife  staff  to
report to the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
the particular childbirth circumstances in which they assist. Multiple
births are one of these.
It  is  possible to  conclude from this that multiple childbirths  are a
common occurrence in this State. In support of this we can find many
specialists for multiple births155 and support program for the families.
3.1.1.3 QUESTION OF PARENTHOOD
Legal  parenthood  can  be  defined  as  possessing  the  legal  parental
rights and responsibilities for a child.
153
 Joyce A. Martin, M.P.H.; Brady E. Hamilton, Ph. D; Michelle J.K. Osterman, 
M.H.S.; Sally C. Curtin, M.A.; T. J. Mathews, M.S., Division of Vital Statistics;
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol.64, No.1, January 15, 2015, at 11.
     Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01.pdf
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 Business and Professions Code Business Section 2016 (a) (3) (I) (ii)
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 Some of whom are : Gill, Pamela J. Coordinator of the Preterm Birth 
Prevention Program Children’s Hospital of San Francisco; GOETZMAN, Boyd
W., Professor of Pediatrics Division of Neonatology Department of Pediatrics 
School of Medicine Univ. of California, Davis, CA; GOLDHABER, Marilyn 
K., Perinatal Epidemiologist Berkeley, CA; KATZ, Michael, Maternal-Fetal 
Specialist Univ. of California San Francisco, CA.
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In the US, a pregnant woman's husband is usually presumed to be the
child's  legal  father.  Marriage,  not  biology  determines  the  legal
parental relationship.156
In States such as California where different sex and same sex couples
can marry,  members of same sex unions benefit  from this  marital
presumption  in  the  same  way  that  heterologous  married  couples
do.157
Since 1 January 2005 in California the law states that when a child is
born the registered domestic partners are the child’s parents.
The rise of ART has prompted many questions regarding assignment
of  legal  parenthood.  New  laws  have  been  enacted  to  legitimize
petitioning parents in  becoming the legal  parents of children born
from  assisted  reproduction  and  to  clarify  the  parental  status  of
donors.
Each state's  approach to  questions  on parenthood reflects  whether
they support biology, intent, marriage or a contractual agreement as
the basis for starting a family.
The Uniform Law Commission has attempted to develop an uniform
parenthood  legislation  through  the  2002  Uniform  Parentage  Act
(UPA)158. The application of the standards is not enforceable by law.
Each individual state is free to implement this Act. The majority have
adopted it.159
156
 This “ marital presumption” is a Common Law presumption, and it is also 
affirm in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) at Section 2.
157
 California Transgender Family Law. Available at: http://www.nclrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Transgender_Family_Law_CA.pdf
158
 Available at:
      http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf
159
 See the enacted status maps at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?
title=Parentage%20Act
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The UPA established that an egg or sperm donor160 is not the parent
of a child when conceived through ART. Parental status can only be
assigned when there was been a normal sexual relationship with the
requested parents.161
In California the presence of a doctor is required in the insemination
program  and  this  is  what  determines  the  donor  and  the  donor-
conceived  offspring's  parenthood.  The  donor  is  excluded  from  a
parenthood relationship if it is specified in the donation agreement
between the parties or if a clinic or fertility bank is used, as is shown
by Jhordan C. v. Mark K. (1986)162 case law.
In this case the court allowed a claim of paternity by the man who
had provided semen to inseminate a friend. The CA Court of Appeal
explains that by California Civil Code:
"a donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife
is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived."163
The woman performed the insemination at home. She could not deny
Jhordan  C.  legal  rights  to  the  baby because  they  did  not  draft  a
written  agreement  concerning Jhordan's  status,  and  they were  not
160
 The comment to the Uniform Parentage Act, Section 702 says that: “donors are
eliminated from the parental equation”
161
 Uniform Parentage Act, Section 202(4), 702.:
      “Assisted reproduction” means a method of causing pregnancy other than 
sexual intercourse. The term includes:
     (A) intrauterine insemination;
     (B) donation of eggs;
     (C) donation of embryos;
     (D) in-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and
     (E) intracytoplasmic sperm injection
162
 Jhordan C. v. Mark K. (1986), 179 Cal.App.3d 386.Available at:
      http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/179/386.html
163
 California  Civ. Code, § 7005.
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aware of the existence of Section 7005 of the Civil Code. The only
possibility to rule out a parenthood claim by a donor is if the semen
is provided to a licensed physician for insemination.
The  case  of:  Steven  v.  Deborah  (2005)164 also  confirms  this
provision.
Here  the  California  Appellate  Court  maintained  that  the  sperm
provider was a donor with no parental status because the child was
conceived by artificial insemination performed by a physician. The
Court applied the Family Code section 7613, subdivision (b).
Deborah and Steven, who were not married, went to a physician to
artificially inseminate  Deborah with  Steven's  sperm.  The cycle  of
fertility  treatment  did  not  give  the  desired  result  and Deborah's
pregnancy did not go full term. Steven and Deborah then had normal
sexual  intercourse  over  a  period  of  month  with  no  resulting
pregnancy.  Shortly after the end of this sexual relationship, Deborah
tried to conceive again through artificial insemination using Steven's
sperm  originally  provided  for  that  purpose.  Deborah  became
pregnant and this time gave birth to a son, Trevor.
The donor argued that he and the mother had attempted to conceive
through sexual intercourse prior to this insemination. Deborah argued
that  conception  occurred  through  the  last  artificial  insemination
procedure.
The court  concluded that the fact a physician was involved in the
treatment to conceive, the donor's potential rights as the father were
inapplicable.
The  court  could  have  provided  a  different  ruling  for  Steven  if  a
written  agreement  had been made before  the  donation,  requesting
that  he be considered as the child's  legal  father.  In fact  this  is  an
exception to what is stated in Section 7613. If prior to conception the
164
 Steven v. Deborah, March 3, 2005; Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 
4, California. Available at:
      http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1258465.html#footnote_1
95
donor and recipient have declared in writing, that they both intend
for the donor to be the father, he will be treated by law as the father
and not the donor.  Therefore this provision states that a man who
provides his sperm directly to a woman also with the assistance of a
medical clinic can be the father.
The decision  to  use  a  known donor  often  further  complicates  the
issue of parenthood. It can mean that both the donor and the recipient
are to be included in the child’s life. What is important is for all the
parties involved to come to an agreement and to adhere to the laws of
the State.
The first step for the parties to make a known donor arrangement is
to determine exactly what the role of the direct donor will be in the
child's life, for example the amount of contact he/she will have with
the baby, as well as the legal standing the donor will have with the
child.
In the absence of legislation case law also plays a crucial  role on
same-sex parental rights.
A recent  California  case  has  created  extrinsic  rules  to  establish
parentage: K.M. v. E.G, 37 Cal. 4Th 130, 144 (Cal. 2005).165
During her same sex relationship with K.M, E.G, a woman who had
been trying for years to get pregnant, was visited by Doctor Mary
Martin at the fertility practice of the University of California at San
Francisco Medical Center (UCSF). After the first failed IVF cycle,
the doctor suggested to use her partner's ova.
E.G. then asked her partner K.M. to donate her ova, explaining that
she would only accept if K.M. "would really be a donor" and E.G.
would "be the mother of any child" born from the donation.
K.M. accepted to donate and she agreed not to disclose to anyone
that  she  was  the  donor.  However  in  court  she  insisted  that  she
165
 K.M .v. E.G, 37 Cal. 4Th 130, 144 (Cal. 2005).Available at:
      https://casetext.com/case/km-v-eg-2
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provided her ova on the understanding that she and E.G. had agreed
to  raise  the  child  together.  Both  K.M.  and  E.G.  also  selected  the
sperm donor together.
Six years later after raising the twin girls for five years together, the
women  broke  up  and  EG  denied  that  KM  was  one  of  the  legal
parents of the children.
K.M. filed a petition to establish her parental rights over the twins.
The clinic consent forms, signed by K.M. showed that she was only
an egg donor and not the parent of the baby conceived using her
eggs.  In  fact  K.M.  had  signed  the  donor  consent  in  which  she
declared  that  no  parental  right  would  be  claimed  by  her  if  any
children were born from her  donation.  So the California Court of
Appeal denied her petition.
The Court  of Appeal  ruled that Sections 7613(b) and 7650 of the
California  Family Code applied in  the case of  K.M.166.  The  court
determined  that  Section  7613(b)  should  be  implemented  in  a
situation  involving  an  egg  donation  to  an  unmarried  woman
regardless of the existence of a lesbian relationship.167
K.M. took her appeal to the California Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeal ruling was reversed. The Supreme Court did not confirm
the rationales of both lower courts,  concluding that Section 7613(b)
did not apply in K.M. v. E.G. because it was not a true egg donation.
166
 Section 7613(b) states: “The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician 
and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 
conceived.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2005). Section 7650 states 
that insofar as I practicable, the provisions applicable  to a father and child 
relationship should determine a mother and child relationship. CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 7650 (West 2005)
167
 K.M., 117 P.3d at 675, 681. The California Supreme Court concluded that 
section 7613(b) does not apply when a lesbian provides her ova to impregnate 
her partner and they raise the children in a joint home. The court specified that 
both the woman who provides her ova and her partner who bears the children 
are the children’s parents.
97
The Supreme Court  underlined that  what  needed to  be taken into
account was not K.M's intention to be a mother but the fact that the
couple lived together and intended to bring the child into their joint
home.  This  fact  was  sufficient  to  establish  K.M.'s  parental
relationship.
According to  the  ruling  on the K.M.  case,  a  lesbian  woman who
donates ova to her partner and intends to raise the resulting child in a
joint home with the gestational mother is legally considered to be a
second  mother  to  the  child.  The  law  applies  even  if  the  lesbian
couple has clearly declared that only the gestational mother will be
the single legal parent.
The most recent and significant provision in the State of California
regarding parentage legal  status,  was approved in October  2013168
when  Sections  of  the  CA  Family  Code  were  amended.  The
innovation of this law was the provision to allow three people to be
the legal parents of a child.
“This bill would authorize a court to find that more than 2
persons with a claim to parentage, as specified, are parents if
the  court  finds  that  recognizing  only  2  parents  would  be
detrimental to the child. The bill  would direct the court, in
making  this  determination,  to  consider  all  relevant  factors,
including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child
from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the
child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for
care  and  affection,  and  who  has  assumed  that  role  for  a
substantial period of time.”
168
 Senate Bill No. 274; Chapter 564; Family law: parentage: child custody and 
support. Available at: 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201320140SB274
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The  three  parenthood  law  can  also  be  applied  to  the  rights  of  a
gamete provider and that of surrogates.
Before the publication of the law there was a case, In Re M.C.169, in
which the California Court of Appeal ruled in a situation of serious
family difficulties. Here the court cleared three parents for baby M.C.
(two mothers: Melissa the biological mother and Irene, her wife; one
father: Jesus, the biological father). This ruling was most probably
the reason for the drafting of that law.
3.1.2 MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts  was  the  first  State  involved  in  the  CDC  SMART
project. Massachusetts created a special form to register information
about  mothers  and  babies  born  in  that  State.170 The  aim  of  this
program was to study and to better understand the impact of ART on
infant and maternal health.
The  most  recent  data  collected  by  these  monitoring  activities171,
shows only 8% of the woman interviewed had used some form of
assistance  to  get  pregnant,  approximately  half  of  this  number
resorted to Assisted Reproduction Technologies.
 The development of ART in this State is significant. Massachusetts
has  42  fertility  specialists  and  requires  insurance  companies  to
reimburse some fertility treatments.  These statistics are provided by
the Resolve172 organisation's survey completed last year. It found an
169
 In Re M.C.195 Cal.App.4th 197 (2011). The decision of the case is available 
at:
      http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2011/b222241/
170
 Massachusetts Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS)
171
 PRAMS record is available at Massachusetts Health and Human Service 
website, at: http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/family-
health/pregnancy-risk-assessment-monitoring-system.html
172
 RESOLVE is a no-profit organization, who works to improve the lives of 
women and men living with infertility. Resolve.org is the official website.
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increase in the fertility services across the country. Resolve assigned
classifications based on these parameters:
• Number of physicians specializing in infertility in state, at 
SART-accredited fertility clinics
• Number of peer-led RESOLVE support groups in state for 
people experiencing fertility issues
• Number of women in state who have experienced physical 
difficulty in getting pregnant or carrying a pregnancy to live 
birth
• Insurance mandate information in each state173
Massachusetts turns out to be one of five states nationally to
receive an ‘A’ for fertility resources, while California has a ‘B’.
 
The figure shown the Massachusetts status identified by RESOLVE.
173
 http://familybuilding.resolve.org/fertility-scorecard/
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3.1.2.1 GAMETE AND EMBRYO DONATION
The provisions for gametes donation in Massachusetts are similar to
Californians.  Massachusetts  clinics  follow  the  ASRM  Guidelines
very strictly.
The clinics requirements for egg and sperm donations are almost the
same  as  those  in  California  clinics  and  banks.  Payment  as  in
California for egg donation has the same range from $5,000/$10,000
(U.S.D.).  Documentation  available  shows  that  sperm  donors  also
appear to have similar payment fees; a sperm donor can receive up to
$100174/$125175 (U.S.D.).
There is more regulation in Massachusetts on embryo donation due
to both law and court cases regarding this question.
Chapter 112 of the Mass. General Law prohibits the use of any live
human foetus or embryo before or after expulsion from the mother's
womb  for  scientific  and  laboratory  research  or  other
experimentation.176 Only  embryos  or  foetuses  that  have  been
implanted in the woman's womb with a resulting pregnancy can be
subject to that law.
The State has enacted a specific law regarding embryo and human
cloning: General Law, Chapter 111L, Section 8.
The  provision  bans  reproductive  human  cloning  and  punishes
persons who knowingly  “sell,  transfer or otherwise obtain human
embryonic,  gametic or cadaveric  tissue for the purpose of human
reproductive  cloning”. Those who do not  respect  these  rules  face
imprisonment  of  up  to  ten  years  or  a  fine  of  up  to  $1,000,000
174
 New England Cryogenic Center; http://www.necryogenic.com/become-a-
donor.php
175
 California Cryobank branch; http://www.spermbank.com/why-donate/sperm-
donor-pay
176
 General Laws, Part I, Title XVI, Chapter112, Section12J
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(U.S.D.).177 However therapeutic cloning is permitted for purposes of
research, but only after written consent from an institutional review
board.
The  Massachusetts  Supreme  Judicature  Court  ruled  on  a  case  of
cryopreservation of embryos and consensus of use: A.Z. v. B.Z.178
B.Z.  (wife)  and A.Z.  (husband) sought  treatment  at  an IVF clinic
over  several  years.  Some  embryos  resulting  from  the  procedures
were frozen with the couple's consent.  The dispute over the frozen
pre-embryos  arose  when  the  father,  in  the  course  of  divorce
proceedings learned of the will of his former wife from his insurance
company. She wanted to implant them and he consequently filed for
an injunction preventing  her  from doing so,  as  it  was  against  his
wishes.
The wife opposed A.Z. and based her request on the initial agreement
between the parties.
The court ruled that the agreement was not enforceable because of
the “change in circumstances”, which could not have been taken into
account  previously.  The  decision  was  also  a  question  of  public
policy:  a  "forced  procreation" is  not  possible.  It  means  frozen
embryos  can  never  be  implanted  if  the  father  withdraws  consent,
even if the mother proves a different agreement between the parties
had been made earlier.
The ruling of the court leaves the frozen pre-embryo agreement in
limbo. The value of these consent forms depends on the will of the
parties but if there are any changes in their personal situations, they
are not enforceable by law. The future of the embryos is limited to
the future of the parents’ relationship, an unknown quantity.
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 General Laws, Part I, Title XVI, Chapter 111L, Section8
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 Available at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ma-supreme-judicial-
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3.1.2.2 QUESTION OF PARENTHOOD
The Uniform Parentage Act (2002) ensures married couples that use
ART for giving birth, that they are the legal parents of the child born.
No  rights  are  reserved  to  the  donor.  This  Act  is  also  enacted  in
Massachusetts.
The woman who gives birth to the child is the legal mother even if
the ova came from a donor, and her husband is the father.
If a sperm donor is anonymous and does not want to be involved in
the conceived children's life, the husband of the mother is considered
to be the legal father under the Common law marital presumption.
In  this  State  as  in  California,  case  law  is  used  as  the  basis  for
regulation.  The  laws  regarding  relationships  between  donors,
recipients and conceived offspring cover specific arguments.
In a historic decision, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health179,
the Massachusetts  Supreme Judicial  Court on 18 November 2003,
ruled the end of the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in
Massachusetts.
It was significant because it was the first of its kind in this country by
a State high court. Gay and lesbian families and their children were
finally  allowed to  have  equal  rights  as  families.  It  meant  that,  in
Massachusetts a child born to a married couple is presumed to be the
child  of  both  members  of  the  couple  independently  of  their
homosexuality or heterosexuality.  This provision only has effect if
the same sex parents are married,  if they are not married children
born in those families have just  one parent registered on the birth
certificate. The other, non biological parent, must adopt the child if
he/she wants to be the second legal parent.
179
 Hillary Goodridge & others vs. department of public health & another, 440 
Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2004).
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What  is  the  fatherhood  of  these  non-marital  children?  The
Massachusetts  law states  that  if  a  man  who is  not  the  biological
father,  or  is  the  donor  of  conceived  children  through  ART is  in
agreement with the mother and wants to be the legal parent of the
offspring,  he  can  sign  the  “voluntary  acknowledgement  of
parentage180” form.
 This is a legal document which can be completed before the child's
birth, and has the same value as a court judgement. It must be filed
with the child's birth certificate and the names of both parents will be
on  that  certificate.  If  any new situation  regarding  the  parenthood
emerges the father has 60 days after signing the form to revoke the
acknowledgment. Within a year he must file a lawsuit in the probate
and family court if there is fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.
The court must order genetic tests and proceed to determine paternity
as  in  a  contested  case.  If  the  court  revokes  the  paternity,  it  must
instruct the Registry of Vital Records to amend the birth record of the
child.
Any agreement between the parties who are in relation with the baby
and  are  known  donors,  is  not  recognized  in  the  State  of
Massachusetts as it is in California.
A sentence of the Massachusetts Supreme Court of 2004181 ruled that
“parenthood by contract” is not allowed by State law and is against
public policy.  An agreement of any type which requires people to
become  a  parent  through  a  contract,  if  taken  to  court  is  not
enforceable.  So we can assume that  any other kind of contractual
arrangement, which enforces the relationship between children and a
third person is not achievable by law. In fact clinics in this part of the
Country  only  reveal  the  person  who  is  the  known  donor  to  the
180
 The form is available at: http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/cse/parents/voluntary-
ack-of-parentage-form.pdf
181
 T.F. v. B.L. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts442 Mass. 522,
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conceived child,  if  he/she requests  this  information  once  reaching
eighteen years of age. Unlike California where the family and donor
relationship with the conceived child is much more open.
3.1.2.3 POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
The Uniform Parentage  Act  regulates  the situation of  posthumous
reproduction through ART. The Act provides that if a person consents
to become a parent through assisted reproduction, but dies before the
placement of gametes or embryos, he/she will not be considered as a
parent  of  any child  resulting  from the  procedure  unless  a  record
exists of his or her will to do so.182 This acknowledgement opens the
possibility for the posthumous offspring to inherit.
Few States including California,183 explicitly regulate the possibility
for children born and conceived after  the death of their  parent  to
inherit. However Massachusetts is not one of these States and has a
specific  position  on  this  subject  resulting  from a  decision  of  the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. This ruling denies the recognition
of a gamete donor as the parent of a posthumously conceived child as
certain requirements were not met.
The case  was  Woodward v.  Commissioner  of  Social  Security,  435
Mass. 536 (2002)184.
James Woodward married the appellant, Lauren in 1993. Three years
later, Mr. Woodward learned that he had leukemia and was advised
that the treatment may have left him sterile. Therefore he decided to
preserve a quantity of his semen in a sperm bank. Unfortunately he
died later that year. Two years after his death in 1995, the wife gave
birth  to  twin girls.  The children  were conceived through artificial
182
 Uniform Parentage Act (2000) §707 (Revised 2002).
183
 Other State are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Texas, North Dakota, Virginia, 
Wyoming and Washington.
184
 Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 435 Mass. 536 (2002)
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insemination using the husband's preserved semen. In January, 1996,
the wife applied for two forms of Social Security survivor benefits
for her children and her. The Social Security Administration rejected
Mrs. Woodward requests. The administrative judge reasoned that the
children were not "ascertainable heirs as defined by the intestacy
laws of Massachusetts" because they were neither born nor in utero
at  the  date  of  the  husband's  death  and  "the  statutes  and  cases
contemplated an ascertainable child, one who had been conceived
prior to the father's death". He also found that the children could not
inherit under Massachusetts intestacy law because the evidence failed
to establish that the husband, before his death neither acknowledged
the children as his own nor intended to contribute to their support.185
After she demonstrated that the twins were the children of her dead
husband,  Ms.  Woodward  requested  the  federal  District  Court  to
release the benefits.  That  Court  asked the Massachusetts  Supreme
Judicial  Court  to  rule  on  the  legal  question.  The  Massachusetts
Supreme  Court  found  that  such  inheritance  rights  exist,  but  only
under certain limited circumstances.
These requirements include:  the gamete provider's  written consent
for posthumous reproduction before his death. The donor must agree
to support any resulting child and his genetic relationship must be
established. When these requirements have been met and the birth
occurs  within  a  reasonable  time  period,  the  Massachusetts  court
legally recognizes the parenthood relationship.
Once  the  genetic  relationship  with  the  offspring  is  identified,  the
children's right to inherit is inevitable.
3.2 SURROGACY
185
 Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 190,§8
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Surrogate  maternity,  more  than  any  other  assisted  reproduction
techniques, raises controversial  debates,  and legislation concerning
surrogacy is differently in each State.
Two  types  of  surrogacy  are  recognized  in  the  USA:  traditional
surrogacy, in which the mother has a genetic relationship to the child
growing inside  her,  so she is  not  only a  carrier  of  the baby;  and
genetic surrogacy, in which the surrogate mother is not genetically
related to the child, an unrelated embryo is implanted in her, she is
just a carrier.
The text is looking at the approach to these techniques focusing on
the States of California and Massachusetts.
Before moving on to the individual characteristics that distinguish
these  States,  it  is  possible  to  have  a  look  at  what  they  have  in
common.
Both allowed the use of surrogacy, on commercial basis, and fertility
clinics  are  available  throughout  the  two  Sates  which  provide  the
procedure.
Singles,  married,  unmarried couples  of  any sexual  orientation  can
have access to the treatment.
The  payment  of  the  surrogate  is  allowed  and  it  is  outline  in  the
surrogacy  arrangement.  The  average  amount  paid  to  a  surrogate
mother is around $35.000 (U.S.D). Compared to the cost of hundreds
of thousands of dollars the intended parents afford for all surrogacy
procedure  is  a  small  price.  The  fertility  clinics  suggest  an
approximate sum of money to pay for the commissioning parents.
Cost  includes  expenses  for  different  needs,  the  price  changes
depending  on  the  numbers  of  gametes  received.  The  clinics  also
suggest  the  possible  costs  that  the  carrier  might  incur  during  her
pregnancy, such as psychological support, drugs and clinics visits,
clothing etc.
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There are situations that can drive up costs, for example a multiple
birth or a Caesarean.
Thus, we can say that the possibility of access to the treatment is not
for everybody, it is only for the wealthiest.
3.2.1 CALIFORNIA
California is probably the State which is more advanced in surrogacy,
although  has  no  statute  that  directly  addresses  the  surrogacy
procedure.  The  state's  courts  have  used  California's  Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) as tool to interpret of different cases related to
the new procedure.  
In California was ruled one of the first, and more famous, case law
on genetic surrogate maternity: Johnson v. Carlvert.186
Mark and Crispina Calvert were unable to have a child. Miss Anna
Johnson, having heard of the Calverts’ situation, offered to serve as a
surrogate. So Miss Johnson was implanted with an embryo created
using Mark's sperm and Crispina's eggs and the child born would be
taken by the Calverts as their child.
In return for three payments of $10,000, the last to be paid six weeks
after  the child's  birth,  and a  $200,000 life  insurance policy,  Anna
agreed to renounce all parental rights to the child. Unfortunately the
relationship  between  the  two  sides  deteriorated  during  Anna's
pregnancy.
Anna  wrote,  few  months  after  the  conception,  to  the  spouses
demanding the last payment, which should have been paid according
186
  Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993)
       Available at:http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/5/84.html
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to the agreement after the child's birth, otherwise she would not give
up the baby.
The Calverts then, decided to go to court to ask for a declaration that
they were the legal parents of the child; Johnson filed a petition to be
recognized as the child's mother. The two cases were consolidated in
front of the same court.
After the birth of the baby, in September, the trial court ordered a
blood analysis to certify the biological relationship of the child with
his genetic parents. The court affirmed that the genetic and natural
parenthood belonged to the Calverts and denied Anna any right to the
child  and  stated  that  the  surrogacy  agreement  was  legal  and
enforceable against her. Miss Johnson appealed up to the California
Supreme Court.
The  Supreme  Court  faced  the  difficulty  of  identifying  the  legal
mother of a child who has both a birth mother and a genetic mother
in  two  different  people.  The  court  used  the  interpretation  of  the
Uniform Parentage Act and the California  Civil  code to solve the
matter. The solution of the dilemma for the court was possible just
looking  at  the  intention  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  surrogacy
agreement. In fact for the UPA both the gestation and genetic ties can
give rise to a presumption of parenthood, but in that case the two
situations did not coincide, so the court explained:
“When the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who
intended to procreate the child-that is,  she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own-is the natural mother under California law.”
In that case the Calverts' intention to create a family was the reason
of the child's birth, so they are considered his/her legal parents. This
also seemed to be the best choice for the child's life, a couple who
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felt so strongly the desire so strongly to have their own family to
create one with the help of another woman.
That  was  also  the  reason  that  urged  the  court  to  reject  the  Miss
Johnson’s arguments, brought to obtain the motherhood of the baby:
she argued that the Calverts are simple gametes donors. The court
stated that:
“...the facts is, however, inaccurate. Mark and Crispina
never intended to "donate" genetic material to anyone.
Rather,  they  intended  to  procreate  a  child  genetically
related to them by the only available means.”
In the end the court explains that surrogacy is a particular case for the
application of UPA because here the will of the parties goes beyond
the  genetics  and  could  not  be  explained  just  through  the  natural
relationship between a pregnant woman and the child she carries in
her womb:
“A  woman  who  enters  into  a  gestational  surrogacy
arrangement  is  not  exercising  her  own  right  to  make
procreative choices; she is agreeing to provide a necessary and
profoundly  important  service  without  (by  definition)  any
expectation that she will raise the resulting child as her own.”
Another case of surrogacy, decided by the California Court of Appeal
in 1994, was a case of traditional surrogacy, ended with the opposite
ruling. The lawsuit was: In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994)187.
187
 In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218 .Available 
at:http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/25/1218.html
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The Moschetta spouse made an agreement with Elvira Jordan, the
surrogate, to be inseminated with the sperm of Mr Robert Moschetta
and to give birth to a child for the couple.
However,  when  the  Moschettas  broke  up  during  her  pregnancy,
Elvira decided to keep the baby, although when the couple reconciled
she relented and allowed the child to go home with them.
Once the  couples  broke up  once  and for  all,  Cynthia,  the  former
Moschetta wife, asked the court to be recognized as the legal mother
of the new born (Marissa), she based this request on the surrogacy
agreement between Moschettas and Elvira Jordan.
The  case  found  a  different  conclusion  than  the  Calvert's  case,
because here Elvira was at the same time the genetic and gestational
mother. The pre-birth arrangement between the parties in that case
could not change the provision on parentage, the contrary would be
against the public policy.
The Court  held  that  the  intended father  and the  surrogate  mother
were  the  legal  parents  of  the  child,  leaving  the  intended  mother
without parental rights.
The solution ruled by the court makes us understand that different
regulations must be applied to two different kinds of surrogacy.
A last case is noteworthy because it gives the opportunity to ponder
about how complex could be the issue of parenthood in surrogacy.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca (1998)188 involves a couple,  John and
Luanne Buzzanca who decided to try with a gestational surrogacy to
have children, because they could not have their own.
They used the gametes from anonymous donors to create embryos,
which were implanted in a surrogate mother.
Before  the  birth  of  the  baby the  Buzzancas'  marriage  failed,  and
Luanne  claimed  the  court  that  the  baby,  not  born  yet,  was  the
188
 In re Marriage of Buzzanca (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1410
     Available at:http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-
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couple's child, instead John said that it was not true. He did not want
to  be  legally  or  financially  responsible  for  a  baby  who  was  not
genetically related to him neither born by his former wife.
Therefore  the  child  that  could  have  six  potential  parents  (two
intended parents; two donors; the surrogate mother and her husband)
was left  with no parents.  In fact  the trial  court  agreed with John,
ruling that the child had no legal parents.
The  Court  of  Appeal,  reversed  the  sentence  pronounced  by  the
precedent court, stating that this case was different from all previous
ones  decided  by  the  Californian  courts.  Quoting  the  Johnson  v.
Calvert case, the court had to decide for the best interest of the child,
so it was not possible to apply a law that could make a baby a legal
orphan. The court concluded that John and Lorraine were the legal
parents  of  the  child,  because  they  started  the  procedure  with  the
intention to become intended parents.
The judgment established that people, who are unable to conceive
and  decide  to  turn  to  artificial  procreation,  with  the  intent  to  be
parents, they will be held to the status of legal parents regardless the
genetic relationship between them and the babies.
California  allows  commercial  surrogacy,  as  well  as  regularly
reinforces agreements with regard to gestational surrogacy189.
The  latest  law  approved  in  California  about  surrogacy  is  the
California  Law  AB-1217190 which  came  into  force  on  1  January
2013.
The  new  legislation  provides  additional  guidance  relating  to  the
manner  in  which  surrogacy  agreements  must  be  enforced,  when
medical  procedures  can  begin,  and  where  parental  establishment
cases may be filed.
189
 California Family Code, Section 7960-7962
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 Full text available here: 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201120120AB1217
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The law makes it possible for all intended parents (regardless of their
marital  status  and/or  their  sexual  orientation)  to  establish  legal
parental rights prior to the birth of their children, without the need to
go through applications for adoption with the pre-birth  order.  The
pre-birth is used to inform everyone that the intended parents are the
legal parents, even if they do not give birth to the child. It becomes
effective from the moment of the birth not before, as it is explained
by the California Family Code at Section 7633.
The time frame to obtain a judgment can take several months so the
lawyers recommend to apply for the pre-birth order after the third
month of pregnancy. This judgment puts also the surrogate mother in
a safe position, leaving her out of the parenthood responsibility. She
will not have after the birth any right on the conceived child.
The hospital, if there is a pre-birth order, has to put the name of the
intended parents on the birth registration form of the child born from
a surrogate. Once this has been done, the registrar will forward the
paperwork  to  the  California  State  Department  of  Vital  Records,
where the baby's birth certificate will be produced, and the child will
always have two parents as in a “normal” conception.
3.2.2 MASSACHUSETTS
In Massachusetts there are no laws regulating surrogacy directly.
The people who make an agreement with a surrogate, take the risk
that  a  court  might  state  later  that  the  contract  has  no  value.
Nevertheless  the  court  cases  have  demonstrated  to  be  in  favor  of
surrogacy and in Massachusetts the agreements are equally legal. In
particular,  the  surrogacy  arrangements  are  realized  through  the
application for a pre-birth order, which establishes the future parental
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situation of the baby who will be born from surrogate, without the
requirement to appear in front of a court.
However it is necessary to examine the State court cases in order to
find out how surrogate maternity has been dealt with up today.
The two major judgments which show the validity of the pre-birth
orders in the State are:  Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
Center191 and Richard I. Hodas v. Kimberly Morin192.
In Culliton  v.  Beth  Israel  Deaconess  Medical  Center  the
Massachusetts  Supreme  Judicial  Court  reviewed  a  surrogacy
agreement between Marla and Steven Culliton, the intended parents,
and  Melissa  Carroll,  the  carrier.  This  was  a  case  of  gestational
surrogacy  where  the  surrogate  was  implanted  with  the  embryos
created  using  the  Cullitons'  gametes.  For  her  role,  the  gestational
carrier  received  a  certain  financial  compensation,  which  was  not
conditioned  “upon  the  termination  of  any  parental  rights  or  the
placement of the child with [the plaintiffs]”.
The Cullitons sought a declaratory judgment to require the hospital
to  list  them, and not  the gestational  mother,  as the parents of the
twins with the support of the surrogate. The three parties here agreed
that Cullitons were the biological parents of the twins, and should
also be the legal parents of them. But for the court it was not an easy
decision  to  make.  The  district  court  dismissed  the  declaratory
concluding that it  is not possible for the court to grant a pre-birth
order of parentage. Under Massachusetts statutes, the court can issue
an order of adoption declaring that the adoptive parents also are the
legal parents of a child, but it cannot be done before the birth of the
child193.
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 Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center ;435 Mass. 285 (2001). 
Available at: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/435/435mass285.html
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 Mass. General Laws, Part II, Title III, Chapter210, Section2. Available at:
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The  Supreme  Judicial  Court,  however,  found  these  statutes  to  be
inapplicable to the Culliton case.
The  twins  born  were  considered  as  the  children  of  the  Culliton
couple, because what the Supreme Court underlined was the genetic
relationship between the babies and the spouses.
If the case had concerned a traditional surrogacy, in which the carrier
would have had a biological as well as a gestational relationship with
the  children,  this  decision  would  not  have  been  possible  for  the
applicants,  and  the  court  would  have  had  to  issue  a  post-birth
adoption order.
In conclusion for the Supreme Judicature Court a district court has
the power to grant a pre-birth order of parentage where the plaintiffs
are the only genetic parents of the children, the carrier agrees with
the  solution  and  the  plaintiffs  have  waived  every  contradictory
provision in the agreement.
This judgment, it is possible to apply only in the presence of these
requirements indicated by the court not in any other situation where
surrogacy treatment is involved.
The  other  noteworthy  case  was  Richard  I.  Hodas  v.  Kimberly
Morin194 concerning,  as  the  previous  one,  a  heterosexual  couple
genetically linked with the baby born under surrogacy. Here it was
discussed the validity of the agreements,  signed in  Massachusetts,
between  the  parties,  to  facilitate  the  request  to  obtain  a  pre-birth
order.  The  choice  to  undergo  the  surrogacy  in  a  Massachusetts'
hospital and to sign an agreement in that State, was dictated only by
the parties’ intent to follow the Massachusetts law even though none
of them resided here.
The situation the court was confronted with was the following: the
plaintiffs,  who were married,  lived in  Connecticut;  the gestational
    https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartII/TitleIII/Chapter210/Section2
194
 Id. 192
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carrier  and  her  husband,  lived  in  New  York;  the  hospital  was  a
licensed hospital of Massachusetts.
The problem of the court was to decide between the possibility of the
parties to decide to be judged by Massachusetts law and the fact that
States were they lived had a different public policy about assisted
reproduction. In Connecticut, gestational carrier agreements are not
overtly prohibited, and may be applied through the recently amended
statute governing the issue of birth certificates. In New York there is
a strong public policy against all gestational carrier agreements, and
in  Massachusetts,  following  the  case  of  Culliton  v.  Beth  Israel
Deaconess  Med.  the  surrogacy  agreements  are  allowed  in  some
circumstances.
The court decided that:
"[w]here the parties have expressed a specific intent as to the
governing law, Massachusetts courts will uphold the parties'
choice as long as the result is not contrary to public policy."
The  judge  explained  that  in  this  situation  they  are  not  facing  a
problem of “forum shopping” so for the best judgment of the case the
court has to refer to Massachusetts provisions.
The  Supreme  Court  remanded  the  settlement  of  the  case  to  the
Probate and Family Court to declare in the pre-birth order that the
intended parents were the legal parents of the unborn child.
This  was possible  because  the entire  procedure of  surrogacy took
place in Massachusetts,  including the surrogacy contract.  It  would
not have been the same if the couple had requested the court to give
validity to a surrogate situation taking place outside the State.
Today there  are  no  judgments  of  the  State  courts  on  homosexual
people, but looking at the fact that the access to surrogacy is allowed
also  to  them under  the  same conditions,  it  is  assumed  that  these
people have the same opportunity given to heterosexuals.
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The limits about surrogacy in Massachusetts are based on the genetic
relation between the foetus and the parent. This restrains the liability
to  demand  a  pre-birth  order,  which  requires  a  blood  relationship
between the intended parents and the unborn child. If the prerequisite
the court can issue a post-birth order, after just four days to the birth,
provided  that  a  valid  surrogacy  agreement  stipulated  in
Massachusetts is enforced.
The last possibility, for those who cannot apply for the birth orders, is
to start a procedure for the adoption of the child.
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FINAL REMARKS
The  results  of  this  study  have  confirmed  the  existence  of  two
different  procedures  for  the  legal  regulation  of  heterologous
fertilisation and surrogacy in the UK and the USA.
The UK legislator chooses to operate with a regulatory framework
for all procedures. Medical activities or research carried out in the
field of fertility must be authorised by the HFEA and all clinics must
be registered with the HFEA to practice ART.
The  premise  of  the  English  legal  approach  is  based  on  the
fundamental principles of the well-being of the patient and the child
from any fertility procedure.
Surrogacy  is  the  only  treatment  which  does  not  have  a
comprehensive  ruling,  but  since  all  other  areas  are  so  strictly
regulated,  it  is  likely  to  have  a  homogeneous  legislation  for  this
reproductive technique in the near future.
It is only studying heterologous fertilisation and surrogacy in the US
that  the  immense  differences  between  the  two  countries  become
apparent. The  extensive  regulations  which  provide  lawyers  and
physicians a solid foundation to operate on in England do not exist in
the US.
Initially  it  was  difficult  to  locate  provisions  regarding  assisted
reproduction in the United States, its legal system is vastly different
to  that  of  England.  It  was  not  possible  to  ratiocinate  like  an
Englishman,  it  was  necessary  to  enter  into  the  American  way of
thinking to fully understand the reasoning behind the US rulings in
fertility techniques.
The US legislation leaves its citizens the freedom to act in deciding
to procreate or not. This is based on a constitutional interpretation
about  the  right  to  privacy.  Some  studies  about  US  behaviour  on
assisted reproduction refer to it as the "Wild West" because it is an
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industry  worth  thousands  of  millions  of  dollars  with  very  little
regulation. Lawyers and specialists in ART are criticized this term:
they underline  that  in  the  silence  of  the  law,  other  regulations  at
Federal level have closed the gap between law and standard practice.
At the same time each of the US States, in the last twenty years, has
started to enact its own regulations to give a legal response to ART
patients  and  to  regulate the  status  of  the  new  families  that  these
procedures  have  created.  Therefore  talking  about  a  "Wild  West"
nowadays would not be correct. In the US the system does not lack
regulation,  the  government  prefers  to  regulate  only the  necessary,
leaving the States free to decide how to rule on fertility procedures.
The words “Wild West” could be used however, in reference to the
economic  question.  In  the  US  the  free  market  policy  allows  the
clinics  to  determine  prices  paid  to  the  donors  and  to  surrogate
mothers.  The  US  approach  allows  the  practice  of  ART  on  a
commercial basis, where as in the UK only the expenses incurred by
donors and surrogates can be reimbursed. This American policy also
has  an  effect  on  the  cost  paid  by  the  ART  applicants  and
consequently, costs in the US are higher than those in England.
In  the  UK  there  is  no  financial  gain  to  be  made  from  these
treatments.  The  imposition  of  monetary  restrictions  in  England  is
often debated in newspapers, with claims that donating or being a
surrogate  mother  are  commitments  that  should  be  adequately
reimbursed. Once again the US decision to substantially compensate
donors and surrogates, shows a wide difference with the UK.
It is not possible to think that a country as vast as America with so
many different States could adopt the same legal rulings for all, even
more so when we consider that assisted reproduction is still  today
such a highly contentious topic under many aspects.
The  legislator  has  allowed  the  US  States  and  their  citizens  the
freedom to regulate ART and the practices associated with it.  The
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states  of  California  and  Massachusetts,  on  which  this  thesis  was
focused,  are  two  of  many  that  have  applied  these  regulatory
procedures in their territories.
It would appear that these two States have decided to rule on many of
the  questions  related  to  assisted  reproduction.  For  now  the  State
Courts and laws have attempted to define the best situation regarding
the judicial issues of ART, balancing the fundamental right to privacy
with  the  rights  of  any  party  involved  in  the  practice  of  fertility
techniques.
Given the ongoing development of these technologies and the impact
they have on society and therefore on the rights of the individual, it
would not be wrong to say that it is only a matter of time before the
Federal  legislature  will  be  confronted  with  the  need  to  create  a
uniform regulation.
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